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 JODI L. SHORT†  
ABSTRACT 
  Reason giving is central to U.S. administrative law and practice. 
Traditionally, courts and scholars alike have located both the 
constraining and the legitimating force of reasons in the constraining 
and legitimating force of Reason, or rationality, but several recent 
developments signal a political turn in understandings of 
administrative justification. First, in upholding the decision of the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to penalize 
broadcasters for televising “fleeting expletives” in the Fox Television 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled the diminished importance of 
reasoned administrative justification and a broadened acceptance of 
political justifications for changes in agency policy. Second, motivated 
by a gathering movement to reconceptualize the legitimacy of 
administrative agencies in terms of their political—and specifically, 
their presidential—accountability, prominent administrative-law 
scholars advocate approaches to arbitrary-and-capricious review that 
would encourage or require agencies to articulate explicitly the 
political reasons for their actions.  
  This Article takes seriously the challenges to the rationalist reason-
giving paradigm posed by political reason-giving models, but it 
categorically rejects their urge to renovate administrative law’s 
fundamental commitment to reasoned justification. Instead, it 
develops a new theoretical framework that sees reasoned justification 
as a constraint embodied not in doctrine or politics, but in the way 
that law and political control structure the organizational 
characteristics and social interactions of agencies. Drawing on this 
framework, the Article critiques models of political reason giving for 
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undermining the social and organizational structures that shape and 
constrain what agencies do and for failing to offer a coherent 
alternative theory of administrative reason giving. The Article 
concludes by arguing more broadly that reform projects must 
consider the institutional dimensions of agency constraint and think 
more deeply about what kinds of agencies they would create. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reason giving is central to U.S. administrative law and practice. 
Courts and legislatures require agencies to support their actions with 
reasons, and administrative-law scholars theorize the practice of 
reason giving as central to constraining and legitimating 
administrative agencies. Traditionally, courts and scholars alike have 
located both the constraining and legitimating force of reasons in the 
constraining and legitimating force of Reason, or rationality, but 
several developments signal a shift in this understanding. 
First, in upholding the decision of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to penalize broadcasters for televising “fleeting 
expletives” in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,1 the U.S. Supreme 
Court engaged in its most sustained discussion of agency reason 
giving since Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.2 Justice Scalia’s analysis 
in Fox signaled the diminished importance of reasoned 
decisionmaking and a broadened acceptance of political justifications 
for changes in agency policy.3 Second, scholars have shown renewed 
interest in agency reason giving, with prominent administrative-law 
scholars advocating approaches to arbitrary-and-capricious review 
that would encourage or require agencies to articulate explicitly the 
political reasons for their actions.4 Among both Supreme Court 
Justices and legal commentators, the pendulum appears to be 
swinging from an understanding of reasons as rationality to an 
understanding of reasons as politics. 
 
 1. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009). 
 2. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). 
 3. See infra Part II.A. But see Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011) (confirming 
the ongoing importance of reasoned administrative decisionmaking). Although Judulang v. 
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011), might be read to cabin the more radical implications of Fox, the 
Fox decision nonetheless suggests the conditions under which some members of the Court 
might be willing to accept political justifications as reasonable, and it has motivated an 
independent body of scholarship pressing for the broader acceptance of political reason giving. 
See infra Part II.B. 
 4. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2010) (“We should require that a significant agency rule include 
at least a summary of the substance of executive supervision.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a 
Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2009) (“[W]hat count 
as ‘valid’ reasons under arbitrary and capricious review should be expanded to include certain 
political influences . . . , so long as the political influences are openly and transparently disclosed 
in the agency’s rulemaking record.”). 
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This political turn in the doctrine governing agency reason giving 
is closely connected with a gathering movement to reconceptualize 
the legitimacy of administrative agencies in terms of their political—
and specifically, their presidential—accountability as opposed to their 
expertise,5 their fidelity to statutory commands,6 or their role as fora 
for robust citizen participation and deliberation.7 Then-Professor 
Elena Kagan makes the signal case for “presidential administration” 
as the reigning model of agency legitimacy, arguing that presidential 
control over administrative agencies promotes their accountability 
and their efficacy, two touchstones of legitimate governance.8 Despite 
the fact that multiple nonpresidential models of agency legitimacy 
continue to inform administrative practice, doctrine, and theory, 
recent scholarship has proclaimed9—or has simply assumed10—the 
supremacy of the presidential model of administration and has set 
about the task of overhauling administrative-law doctrine to comport 
with this understanding. 
 
 5. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (advocating 
expertise as the core justification for the New Deal administrative state); Richard B. Stewart, 
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (chronicling 
various justifications for the administrative state, including expertise). 
 6. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1676 (referring to strict fidelity to statutory commands as 
the “transmission belt” model of administrative law). 
 7. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (“[G]overnment’s primary responsibility is to enable the 
citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach a consensus on the common 
good.”); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1679 (noting that rigorous enforcement of procedural 
requirements, such as hearings, may enhance agency legitimacy by affording broader citizen 
access to agencies). 
 8. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–46 (2001). 
 9. See Watts, supra note 4, at 38–39 (“[O]ne major advantage of rethinking hard look 
review . . . is that hard look could be better harmonized with administrative law’s current 
embrace of political decisionmaking.”). Professor Kathryn Watts suggests that political-control 
models have not merely supplemented, but have supplanted, expertise-based models of 
administration. Id. She argues that they have “widespread acceptance” among scholars, id. at 35, 
and that they drive key doctrinal areas of administrative law, most notably the doctrinal 
framework created by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), Watts, supra note 4. at 13, 84. She does not discuss the erosion of Chevron’s force 
and coherence in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and its ongoing contestation—or, in the view of some, its “ongoing 
obfuscation”—in more recent cases such as Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 
131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). Id. at 1340 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These doctrinal developments are 
difficult to square with a strong version of the presidential-control model. 
 10. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1130 (asserting that whereas presidential 
administration is assumed to play a positive role in agency action, “presidential . . . influence on 
an agency decision is not clearly good or bad”). 
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The Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s)11 arbitrary-and-
capricious standard12 has been identified as an important area for 
renovation. Under prevailing understandings of the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard, a court’s role in reviewing agency exercises of 
policymaking discretion is to ensure “that agencies have engaged in 
reasoned decisionmaking.”13 To make this assessment, courts have 
required “that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its 
action,”14 establishing a “rational connection between the facts found 
and the choice made.”15 Traditionally, valid reasons establishing this 
connection have taken the form of empirical evidence, policy 
arguments, agency expertise, or logical arguments based on statutory 
language or the purpose of the broader statutory scheme 
administered by the agency.16 Political reason-giving models would 
expand the universe of valid reasons for agency action to include a 
claim by the agency that it followed a presidential directive that was 
itself supported by good reasons.17 This shift in the object of judicial 
review—from demanding rational reasons and evidence developed by 
an agency to inquiring into conformance with well-supported 
presidential directives—has the potential to alter fundamentally not 
only the nature of arbitrary-and-capricious review but also the way 
agencies structure their decisionmaking processes and conceptualize 
their policymaking role. 
This Article resists the drive to renovate administrative law’s 
fundamental commitment to reasoned justification and seeks more 
broadly to force a searching and skeptical consideration of doctrinal 
reform motivated by the intellectual vogue for presidentialism. The 
 
 11. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 12. See id. § 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”). 
 13. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483–84 (2011). 
 14. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009). 
 15. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 16. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 82 (2008). 
 17. For a more detailed description and analysis of how political reasons have been defined 
by their proponents and for examples of what counts as a valid political reason under the 
proposed models, see infra Part II.B. In addition, Professor Watts would also accept certain 
kinds of congressional influence as valid justification for agency action. See Watts, supra note 4, 
at 63 (“[C]ongressional influences could serve as yet another possible source of political 
influence that—if openly disclosed—could help to adequately explain an agency’s rulemaking 
decision for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review.”).  
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Article has two immediate aims. First, it provides a deep critique of 
political reason-giving proposals, not through a point-by-point 
rebuttal as others have ably done,18 but rather by exposing the 
inconsistency of these proposals with any credible theory of 
administrative justification. Second, it develops a new theoretical 
framework for understanding the mechanisms by which reasoned 
justification shapes and constrains administrative agencies. Agencies 
are disciplined not solely by the constraints of rationality, legal 
doctrine, and political power, but also by the social and institutional 
environments in which they are embedded.19 Using a novel 
application of sociological theory to deference doctrine, this theory of 
administrative justification demonstrates how reason giving shapes 
agencies through their organizational structures and their social 
interactions with the other branches of government. The sociological 
theory of reason giving further highlights the real danger of political 
reason giving: it is likely to erode the social mechanisms that shape 
agencies as organizations and that discipline their day-to-day 
activities. 
 
 18. See Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A Response to 
Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 574–79 (2010) (arguing that political reason giving is 
contrary to the goal of the comment process in that it undermines the importance of citizen 
participation and evidence-based decisionmaking); Stephen M. Johnson, Disclosing the 
President’s Role in Rulemaking: A Critique of the Reform Proposals, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1003, 
1033 (2011) (arguing that courts might have difficulty discerning what weight to give to political 
factors and that this difficulty might lead to more uncertainty in judicial review); Glen 
Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 849, 893–97 (2012) (arguing that political reason giving may undermine deliberative 
democracy).  
 19. See, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 
5 (2001) (arguing that an agency’s autonomy and influence are dependent on the network of 
interests in which it is embedded); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private 
Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 383–84 
(2006) (exploring how the delegation of regulatory interpretation to regulated private firms 
shapes agency accountability); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between 
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426 (2009) (discussing the 
interrelationship between separation-of-powers doctrine and institutional constraints on the 
executive branch); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring 
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1675–91 (2006) 
(describing how the structure of the intelligence bureaucracy shapes the nature and efficacy of 
administrative national-security policies); see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the 
Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 587, 591 (2009) (demonstrating how the organizational structure of the Federal Security 
Agency enhanced presidential control). 
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Beyond the immediate debate about political reason giving, this 
theoretical framework provides a new way of thinking about 
administrative-law reform more generally. If the constraints of 
administrative law are ultimately enacted at the micro- and meso-
levels through organizational structures and social interactions, then 
administrative-law doctrine must attend to its impact on these crucial 
structures and processes. It is important to understand how different 
rules might support or undermine the mechanisms that so deeply 
influence what agencies do. Administrative-law scholarship should 
think not only about the formal coherence of doctrine but also about 
what kinds of agencies different doctrinal frameworks might create. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the doctrinal 
framework for administrative reason giving and the rationalist 
theories of reason giving that have developed to explain and justify it. 
Part II identifies the political turn in administrative reason giving that 
court decisions and scholarship have taken, revising conventional 
rationalist accounts of what should count as a valid reason to 
encompass certain political justifications for administrative action. 
Part III explores possible theoretical bases for political reason giving, 
including presidential-control theory and information-disclosure 
theory, and concludes that neither supports the practice. Part IV 
draws on sociological accounts of reason giving to develop a new 
theory of administrative justification that sees its constraints 
embodied not solely in doctrine or politics, but also in the way that 
those forces structure the organizational characteristics and social 
interactions of agencies. I conclude by drawing out the implications of 
this analysis more generally, suggesting that administrative-law 
reform should attend to how doctrine might influence the social and 
organizational structures that shape agencies. A viable doctrinal 
framework must be defensible in these terms. 
I.  THE PREVAILING ACCOUNT OF  
ADMINISTRATIVE REASON GIVING 
A. Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review Doctrine 
Administrative-law doctrine places reason giving at the center of 
agency policymaking and judicial review. The APA explicitly requires 
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agencies to provide reasons for certain decisions,20 and courts have 
demanded that agencies supply reasons more broadly as an essential 
basis for judicial review. Since 1943, in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,21 the 
Court has made clear that agency actions will stand or fall based on 
the reasons that the agency itself provides, even if other reasons could 
be found to support those actions.22 In Citizens To Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe,23 the Court adapted this generalized reason-giving 
requirement to arbitrary-and-capricious review under the APA, 
demanding that agencies “disclose the factors that were considered” 
as well as the agency’s “construction of the evidence” in order to 
facilitate judicial review.24 Agencies responded by supplying reasons 
to justify their policy actions, and courts have long viewed their role 
as ensuring that those reasons establish a “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice[s] made”25 by the agencies. 
Since 1983, State Farm has supplied the standard for assessing the 
adequacy of an agency’s reasons for its decisions. Although State 
Farm stressed the “narrow” scope of judicial review under the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard and cautioned that a “court is not 
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,”26 it also commanded 
reviewing courts to “consider whether [a] decision [had been] based 
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there ha[d] 
been a clear error of judgment.”27 State Farm articulated several 
factors that are “relevant”28 to the question of an administrative 
decision’s validity, including (1) whether the agency relied on factors 
that Congress had not intended it to consider;29 (2) whether the 
 
 20. See Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“All [agency] 
decisions [with respect to procedures requiring a hearing] . . . shall include a statement 
of . . . findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor . . . .”). 
 21. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 89 (holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s action “must 
be judged by the standards which the Commission itself invoked,” even if other reasons might 
have supported it). 
 23. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 24. Id. at 420. 
 25. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 
(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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agency looked at all important aspects of the problem, including 
viable policy alternatives;30 (3) whether the agency’s explanation for 
its decision was consistent with the evidence before it;31 and 
(4) whether the agency’s view was “so implausible” that it could not 
be considered a mere policy judgment or product of agency 
expertise.32 
State Farm’s version of hard-look review33 not only made reason 
giving central to administrative policymaking but also made clear 
what kinds of reasons will suffice. Specifically, it endorsed what 
Professors Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy describe as the 
“rationalist” model of reason giving.34 In contrast with earlier, highly 
deferential standards of review that upheld agency action “as long as 
it was ‘conceivably’ supported by the facts in the record,”35 the 
rationalist approach represents a more searching model that places 
the onus on the agency (1) to document reasons for its decisions; (2) 
to compile evidence supporting those reasons; (3) to consider, 
 
 30. Id. at 43, 51. 
 31. Id. at 43. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Hard-look review is a doctrinal framework that developed in the D.C. Circuit during 
the 1970s and that was generally perceived as increasing the stringency with which courts 
reviewed agency decisions. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the 
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency 
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 406. Some have characterized it as requiring courts to take a 
hard look at the substance of an agency’s decision and the process through which that decision 
was adopted; others have characterized it as requiring courts to ensure that the agency itself 
took a hard look at the issues. See generally id. at 419–22 (describing the “‘hard look’ review” 
standard). There is some controversy over which version the Court adopted and whether the 
Court’s version is as stringent as the D.C. Circuit’s. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The Commission’s 
action in cutting off consideration of waste disposal and reprocessing issues in licensing 
proceedings based on the cursory development of the facts which occurred in this proceeding 
was capricious and arbitrary.”), rev’d sub nom. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 55, 66–67 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (affording “careful and exhaustive” consideration to proposed Environmental Protection 
Agency regulations); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(remanding for further proceedings an agency’s decision to deny a suspension of the 
requirements of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857–1857l (1970), with respect to a truck 
manufacturer). And some commentators argue that State Farm should not be read to have 
adopted hard-look review at all. E.g., Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 452–57 (2009). I do not address these debates here, but I 
note that it is conventional in the literature to refer to the State Farm standard as hard-look 
review. E.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1749, 1777–78 (2007). 
 34. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 33, at 411. 
 35. Id. at 410 (quoting Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 182 (1935)). 
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analyze, and reject contrary evidence; and (4) to consider, analyze, 
and reject important alternatives to its preferred policy based on the 
available evidence.36 Although many have charged that the intensive 
justificatory practices that developed in response to the doctrinal 
demands of hard-look review are an onerous drag on agency 
policymaking,37 a substantial literature has developed to explain and 
justify hard-look review’s reason-giving requirement. The next 
Section examines the theoretical bases for rationalist reason giving by 
administrative agencies. 
B. Rationalist Theories of Reason Giving 
The legal literature has developed an extensive account of the 
work reasons do in the administrative context. According to this 
literature, the rationalist reason-giving requirement provides external 
checks on agency power, constrains internal decisionmaking 
processes, demonstrates respect for governed subjects, and enhances 
the legitimacy of agency decisions by rationalizing them. I summarize 
each argument in this Section. 
First, reason giving facilitates external checks on the exercise of 
agency power. Reasons provide two interrelated mechanisms for 
“policing official behavior”38: first, they promote political 
accountability, and second, they enable judicial review. Reason giving 
 
 36. Cf. id. at 423–24 (summarizing the “substantive content” that the Court introduced into 
arbitrary-and-capricious review in State Farm). 
 37. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 49 (1993); CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., TECH. & GOV’T, RISK AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 107 (1993); JERRY L. MASHAW 
& DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 199, 224–55 (1990); Jerry L. Mashaw 
& David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. 
ON REG. 257, 262 (1987); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: 
A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 532–36 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419, 1444 (1992) 
[hereinafter McGarity, Some Thoughts]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory 
Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81, 83 (1996); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 72 (1997) 
[hereinafter Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency Actions]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To 
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Seven 
Ways]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the 
District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 37 DUKE L.J. 300, 
301 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: 
How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 
8 (1991). 
 38. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, 
and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 103 (2007). 
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promotes political accountability by making the administrative 
decisionmaking process more transparent and thus more accessible to 
citizens and more amenable to congressional oversight. As one 
commentator puts it, “The reason-giving administrator is . . . more 
subject to general public surveillance.”39 Moreover, citizens who can 
survey administrative processes are more empowered to participate in 
those processes40 so as “to evaluate, discuss, and criticize [agency] 
action, as well as potentially to seek political or legal reform.”41 
Reason giving also facilitates congressional oversight and control of 
agencies by making them more transparent both to members and to 
their constituents.42 Rationalist reasons are therefore a key 
mechanism of democratic and political oversight. In addition, reasons 
are a “protector of judicial review.”43 Reasons render the 
administrative process more transparent for judges and, at the same 
time, create a record that will enable judicial review.44 Robust judicial 
review, in turn, reinforces and makes more credible the exercise of 
external control by informed citizens who can sue the agency if it fails 
to take account of their views.45 
Second, in addition to facilitating external policing of agency 
action, reason giving shapes the internal decisionmaking dynamics of 
agencies in ways that tend to cabin administrative discretion. Here as 
well, two distinct mechanisms are at work. First, many argue that the 
imperative to provide rational reasons has a “decision-disciplining” 
 
 39. Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 181. 
 40. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 529 (2003) (“[T]he [reasoned-decisionmaking] 
requirement may promote accountability by ensuring public participation in or oversight of the 
administrative process. It may even coincide with political control of the administrative 
process.”). 
 41. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1278 
(2009). 
 42. See Bamberger, supra note 19, at 403 (“[W]ide managerial discretion may . . . obscur[e] 
the reasons underlying particular decisions. In this way, broad leeway can imperil the ability of 
democratic or constitutional institutions like the public, Congress, and the courts to oversee 
agencies and review their decisions.”); Bressman, supra note 33, at 1780 (arguing that reasoned 
decisionmaking is “a special form of accountability related to legislative monitoring”). 
 43. Mashaw, supra note 38, at 111 (emphasis omitted). 
 44. See Shapiro, supra note 39, at 182 (“[O]nce a judge has a record, anything is possible.”); 
see also Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (remanding 
the case for lack of a record of the reasons for the agency decision). 
 45. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in 
the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 736–37 (1996) (describing how litigation can 
be part of an ongoing relationship between interest groups and regulators). 
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effect46 that improves the quality of agency decisionmaking. Professor 
Martin Shapiro argues, for instance, that “[a] decisionmaker required 
to give reasons will be more likely to weigh pros and cons carefully 
before reaching a decision than will a decisionmaker able to proceed 
by simple fiat.”47 Such a decisionmaker is also more likely to consider 
all of the evidence for and against a given policy. This deliberative 
stance toward policy decisionmaking is said to filter out tendencies 
toward “bias, self-interest, insufficient reflection, or simply excess 
haste”48 on the part of administrators who know that they must justify 
their actions in rational terms. Second, reasons are said to exercise a 
kind of prospective discipline on an agency by narrowing the choices 
it can make in the future and the grounds on which it can make them. 
Reasons given to support one decision tend to shape and constrain an 
agency’s future decisions through a path-dependent logic. Reasons 
commit the reason giver to a certain amount of consistency, 
“although not inviolably so.”49 Although reasons articulated in one 
case do not strictly bind a decisionmaker in future cases, as a matter 
of social practice the reason giver commits herself to deciding some 
range of future cases in accordance with the general principles 
embodied by the reasons given in a prior case.50 At the very least, 
reasons provide interested parties with grounds on which to argue 
that prior reasoning should guide future decisions. 
Third, reason giving lends a kind of moral force to agency 
decisions because the act of giving reasons demonstrates respect for 
the governed subject. Reason giving is “a way to bring the subject of 
the decision into the enterprise.”51 It “emphasizes the obligation of 
public officials and citizens to engage with one another on the 
substance of policy issues with an attitude of mutual respect.”52 The 
implied alternative is a tyrannical government that imposes its 
policies on citizens without respect for their wishes or their 
personhood. As Professor Jerry Mashaw cautions, the exercise of 
“[a]uthority without reason is literally dehumanizing.”53 
 
 46. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657 (1995). 
 47. Shapiro, supra note 39, at 180. 
 48. Schauer, supra note 46, at 657. 
 49. Id. at 656. 
 50. Id. at 656–57. 
 51. Id. at 658. 
 52. Staszewski, supra note 41, at 1286. 
 53. Mashaw, supra note 38, at 118.  
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Finally, reason giving legitimates the exercise of administrative 
power. Civic republicans and others partial to deliberative-democratic 
models of agency legitimacy see reasons as a mechanism for 
facilitating dialogue toward the end of generating public consensus 
around policy outcomes.54 The reasons agencies give for their 
decisions provide the basis for citizen deliberation and dialogue with 
the government, and this dialogue can shape preferences and 
promote “broad consensus around a particular solution.”55 This broad 
consensus legitimates agency policy. Even when agencies’ public-
regarding rationales fail to achieve consensus, “reasoned consistency” 
can supply its own form of legitimacy by demonstrating the objective 
rationality of a given decision.56 A dominant view among scholars of 
reason giving is that rationality is “the touchstone of legitimacy in the 
liberal, administrative state,”57 ultimately eclipsing political and other 
forms of accountability.58 According to this view, “the legitimacy of 
bureaucratic action resides in its promise to exercise power on the 
basis of knowledge,”59 and reasons provide evidence that the agency 
has, in fact, done so. As Professor Mashaw writes, “The path of 
American administrative law has been the path of the progressive 
submission of power to reason.”60 
II.  THE POLITICAL TURN IN ADMINISTRATIVE REASON GIVING 
If the State Farm majority defined the rationalist reason-giving 
paradigm, a partial concurrence in that case contained the seeds of 
what I describe as the political turn. On review in State Farm was the 
Reagan administration’s rescission of a safety standard issued by 
President Carter’s Department of Transportation (DOT) that 
required auto manufacturers to install either air bags or automatic 
 
 54. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 7, at 1514 (“[G]overnment’s primary responsibility is to 
enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the 
common good.”); Staszewski, supra note 41, at 1280 (“It is not enough for a decision maker to 
follow her own or her constituents’ pre-political preferences, but she must instead be capable of 
explaining why a particular course of action is best for the community as a whole.”).  
 55. Staszewski, supra note 41, at 1282. 
 56. Bressman, supra note 40, at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 25 (2001). 
 58. See supra note 40. 
 59. Mashaw, supra note 38, at 117. 
 60. Mashaw, supra note 57, at 26. 
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seat belts in new-model cars.61 Although politics had clearly motivated 
this decision62—President Reagan had run on a deregulatory agenda,63 
presumably supported by the majority of citizens that elected him—
the Justices in the State Farm majority failed to consider the 
implications of the president’s electoral mandate for the validity of 
this change in policy. Instead, the Court invalidated the DOT’s 
rescission on the ground that the agency’s justifications had failed to 
meet the appropriate standard of “reasoned decisionmaking.”64 
Specifically, the Court held that the DOT had failed to consider 
alternatives to a complete rescission65 and that the agency had failed 
adequately to explain evidence before it that was inconsistent with its 
proffered basis for the decision.66 
Although the Justices in the partial concurrence authored by 
then-Justice Rehnquist agreed that the agency had failed adequately 
to justify key aspects of its decision, they also criticized the majority 
for ignoring the political context of the agency’s decision: 
  The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to 
the election of a new President of a different political party. It is 
readily apparent that the responsible members of one administration 
may consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more 
important than do their counterparts in a previous administration. A 
change in administration brought about by the people casting their 
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s 
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. 
As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by 
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate 
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.67 
Long a boundary-pushing hypothetical for professors of 
administrative law, this passage now motivates an emerging theory of 
political reason giving in administrative law based on Justice 
Rehnquist’s intuition that politics should count in courts’ appraisals of 
 
 61. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
34–36 (1983). 
 62. Cf. id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The agency’s 
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a 
different political party.”). 
 63. MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 30 (1985). 
 64. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51–52 (majority opinion). 
 65. Id. at 56. 
 66. Id. at 54. 
 67. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). 
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administrative decisions. The following Sections outline the contours 
of the political turn that has emerged in courts’ and commentators’ 
views of reason giving. 
A. The Court’s Political Turn? 
In 2009, the Supreme Court engaged in its most extensive 
reflection on administrative reason giving since State Farm in a case 
filed by Fox Television and other broadcasters against the FCC for 
the agency’s repeal of a longstanding “safe harbor” policy protecting 
isolated utterances of profanity on broadcast television.68 The Court’s 
decision in Fox upheld the FCC’s order declaring actionably indecent 
Fox’s broadcast of profane utterances by Hollywood stars as they 
accepted and presented awards during live telecasts of the 2002 and 
2003 Billboard Music Awards.69 The FCC rested its order on the 
statutory “indecency ban,” which prohibits broadcasting of 
“any . . . indecent . . . language.”70 Although the ban had been in effect 
since 1948,71 it had long been tempered by the FCC’s “safe harbor” 
policy, under which the agency had declined to prosecute violations 
involving “fleeting expletives,” or isolated utterances of single, vulgar 
words used as expletives rather than to refer literally to sexual or 
excretory activities.72 
In 2000, the FCC for the first time pursued an enforcement 
action against a broadcaster for televising a single, fleeting expletive.73 
It cited NBC for a broadcast of the Golden Globes in which the 
singer Bono, upon winning an award, had exclaimed, “This is really, 
really, fucking brilliant!”74 The FCC used this enforcement action to 
announce its changed position on the safe-harbor policy.75 Then, on 
 
 68. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 69. Id. at 1819. 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). 
 71. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1464, 62 Stat. 683, 769 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)). 
 72. See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (discussing the FCC’s departure from the safe-harbor 
policy); Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden 
Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4980 (2004) (“While prior Commission and staff 
action have indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are 
not indecent or would not be acted upon, . . . we conclude that any such interpretation is no 
longer good law.”). 
 73. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807. 
 74. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4976 n.2. 
 75. See id. at 4980 (“While prior Commission and staff action have indicated that isolated 
or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are not indecent or would not be acted 
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the basis of the Golden Globes order,76 the FCC cited Fox for similar 
infractions on its awards shows.77 Fox challenged the FCC’s 2006 
order in part on the ground that the FCC’s change to the safe-harbor 
policy had been arbitrary and capricious—specifically, that the 
change had not been sufficiently justified by the reasons the agency 
gave for it.78 
In its Golden Globes order, the FCC provided four reasons in 
support of its rescission of the safe-harbor policy and its new policy of 
citing broadcasters for fleeting expletives. First, it argued that the 
distinction between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words was 
incoherent, especially with respect to the “F-word.”79 Even when the 
word had not been used literally, the FCC found it to be “patently 
offensive” because, the FCC maintained, it “is one of the most vulgar, 
graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English 
language.”80 Second, the FCC argued that categorically exempting 
fleeting expletives from enforcement would encourage more 
widespread use of offensive language, albeit one word at a time.81 
Third, it argued that enforcement action was necessary to “safeguard 
the well-being of the nation’s children,”82 who would be forced to 
suffer the harmful “first blow”83 of fleeting profanities. Finally, the 
FCC noted that advances in technology had made it easier to bleep 
 
upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such interpretation is no longer 
good law. . . . We now clarify . . . that the mere fact that specific words or phrases are not 
sustained or repeated does not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently 
offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent.”). 
 76. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975 (2004). 
 77. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 
2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,299, 13,329 (2006). At the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, aired live on 
Fox, award winner Cher said, “[F]uck ‘em,” in response to her critics. Id. at 13,300. At the 2003 
Billboard Music Awards, again aired live on Fox, Nicole Richie said, “Have you ever tried to 
get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.” Id. 
 78. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that Fox was challenging the FCC’s “notices of apparent liability” on, among others, 
administrative grounds and holding that the change in policy was arbitrary and capricious 
because “the FCC ha[d] failed to articulate a reasoned basis for this change in policy”), rev’d, 
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).  
 79. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4978 (“[W]e believe 
that, given the core meaning of the ‘F-word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any context, 
inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within the first prong of our indecency 
definition.”). 
 80. Id. at 1479. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads., 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,308. 
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out offensive language in live broadcasts without compromising the 
integrity of the program.84 The FCC provided no evidence supporting 
its reasons. Instead, it based them on commonsense intuitions about 
the sensibilities of children and the behavioral proclivities of 
broadcasters. 
The Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s orders on the basis that 
the FCC had satisfied the reason-giving requirement as articulated 
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.85 In his opinion 
supporting this result, Justice Scalia made some provocative 
suggestions about the nature of administrative reasons. 
First, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggested that reasons need not 
necessarily be well reasoned. Justice Scalia acknowledged that aspects 
of the FCC’s explanation for its change in the fleeting-expletives 
policy “may not [have been] entirely convincing.”86 Nonetheless, his 
opinion accepted the agency’s justification on the ground that, at a 
minimum, it demonstrated “that the Commission knew it was making 
a change.”87 Although Justice Scalia did not address this tension 
squarely, his acceptance of minimally persuasive reasons suggests that 
agencies that are changing policy need not be convincing; they need 
only be aware. It was apparently sufficient that the agency had not 
changed its policy accidentally and that it had not actively tried to 
conceal the change.  
Second, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggested that reasons need not 
necessarily be supported by empirical evidence—even when they 
make empirical claims. Justice Scalia opined that courts must accept 
the reality that “[t]here are some propositions for which scant 
empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of 
broadcast profanity on children is one of them.”88 According to his 
opinion, an agency cannot be expected to conduct its own controlled 
experiments testing the effects of indecency on children to support its 
empirical claims about these effects.89 More controversially, Justice 
Scalia tacitly endorsed the FCC’s failure to address the existing 
studies cited by the dissent that found no evidence of a connection 
between broadcast profanity and children’s well-being. Thus, the 
 
 84. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4980. 
 85. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009). 
 86. Id. at 1812. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 1813. 
 89. Id. at 1813–14. 
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Court’s new model of administrative reason giving arguably absolves 
an agency of the responsibility to locate and address existing research 
on the subject it is regulating.90 
Third, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggested that reasons need not 
necessarily be apolitical. When an agency has changed its policy, the 
Court implied that it would credit the fact that the agency simply 
“believe[d] [the new policy] to be better” than the old.91 This signal 
opened the door, at least in theory, to arbitrary-and-capricious review 
of the type imagined by Justice Rehnquist in State Farm—a level of 
review that would defer to agency policies that reflect “the 
philosophy of the administration.”92 
To be sure, a more measured reading of Fox than the one I have 
suggested is possible,93 and such a reading may, in fact, more 
accurately reflect the significance (or lack thereof) of this decision. 
Five Justices in Fox disavowed any reliance on politics in the review 
of agency decisions.94 A unanimous Court has since affirmed the 
central importance of rationality in agency policymaking,95 to some 
extent quelling fears about the more radical implications of Fox. This 
 
 90. Note that this position stands in stark contrast to the Court’s approach in State Farm, in 
which a majority suggested that the DOT should conduct its own studies to resolve gaps and 
conflicts in existing research. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 53–54 (1983) (urging the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
to “bring its expertise to bear” on gaps in industry studies regarding the effect of inertia on the 
effectiveness of detachable automatic seatbelts). 
 91. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811. 
 92. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
What is perhaps most notable about the Court’s exegesis on administrative reason giving is that 
it took place in the context of the adjudication of a regulated entity’s rights in an enforcement 
action. Even academic advocates of political reason giving decline to extend their models to the 
adjudicatory context, much less to the enforcement context. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, 
at 1131 (“[A]djudication is beyond the scope of this Article.”); Watts, supra note 4, at 8 n.14 
(“In the rulemaking context, agencies act as mini legislatures, whereas agencies act as mini 
courts in the adjudicatory context. This distinction may well demand a different role for politics 
in rulemaking vs. adjudication.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Armijo, supra note 18, at 581 (arguing that “at most, Fox means that . . . the 
APA does not require an agency to harmonize its past policies when undertaking a new policy 
direction outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
 94. Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, discusses the 
importance of “regulation that does not bend too readily before the political winds.” Fox, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1829–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although Justice Kennedy joins most of Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion, he writes separately to stress that agency policies must be “justified by neutral 
principles and a reasoned explanation.” Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 95. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 485 (2011) (requiring agencies to limit their 
statutory scope “in some rational way”).  
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Section’s aim is not to articulate what the Fox decision, taken as a 
whole, does or should mean, but instead to highlight the outer 
boundaries of what Justice Scalia’s decision in that case could be read 
to mean and to suggest how hospitable that reading is to the 
politicization of agency reason giving. Although it is not clear what a 
valid political reason would look like under Justice Scalia’s analysis, 
commentators have already begun exploring the possibilities created 
by his approach to administrative reason giving. 
B. The Political Turn in Legal Scholarship 
Whatever the doctrinal significance of Fox, the case was followed 
closely by prominent calls by legal academics for political reason 
giving. In the Yale Law Journal, Professor Kathryn Watts argues that 
courts should rework the doctrine governing hard-look review to take 
account of the political reasons for agencies’ decisions.96 Professor 
Nina Mendelson argues in the Michigan Law Review that agencies 
should be statutorily required to disclose the political influences on 
their actions and that they should receive greater deference on 
judicial review when those reasons are “public-regarding.”97 Both 
these models of political reason giving build on earlier work by Dean 
Christopher Edley98 and then-Professor Kagan99 advocating greater 
political control of the bureaucracy and suggesting that deference 
doctrines should adopt the flexibility to account for political 
influences on agencies. But Professors Watts and Mendelson go much 
further in their analysis and advocacy of political reason giving, and 
their scholarship thus epitomizes the political turn addressed in this 
Article. 
Professor Watts argues that traditional conceptions of arbitrary-
and-capricious review should be expanded beyond what she 
 
 96. Watts, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
 97. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1168. As I have noted, the academic commentary on 
political reason giving is confined to the rulemaking context on the theory that political 
justifications for the adjudication of individual rights would pose thornier problems. Watts, 
supra note 4, at 8 n.14. 
 98. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990) (providing “a critical exposition of how 
administrative law shapes governance, especially through judicial review of actions taken by 
executive branch agencies and departments”). 
 99. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2385 (urging the “modification of certain administrative-law 
doctrines in ways that will promote presidential control of administration”). 
SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  1:56 AM 
1830 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1811 
characterizes as a “singular technocratic focus”100 on data and 
expertise. Instead, she contends, arbitrary-and-capricious review 
should credit “certain political influences.”101 She envisions an 
approach to arbitrary-and-capricious review that attends to the blend 
of statutory, factual, empirical, and political factors that produce 
administrative decisions.102 In her scheme, an agency would receive 
enhanced deference on judicial review if it could demonstrate that its 
policy choice had been based on legitimate political reasons.103 
Professor Mendelson takes a different approach to political 
reason giving. Rather than expanding deference doctrine to 
encourage the disclosure of political reasons for administrative 
actions, she would statutorily require agencies to disclose executive 
influence on significant rulemaking decisions.104 Critically, she would 
require agencies to disclose not only presidential influences that 
might be seen as legitimating, ostensibly justifying greater judicial 
deference in the manner envisioned by Professor Watts, but also 
those that might be seen as delegitimating.105 Like Professor Watts, 
however, Professor Mendelson argues that so long as agencies 
disclose all relevant political influences on their decisions, courts 
should defer to agencies when those disclosures reveal legitimate 
political reasons for their actions.106 
Professors Watts and Mendelson have similar conceptions of 
what constitutes a valid political reason deserving of judicial 
deference. As a baseline matter, they agree that legitimate political 
reasons for an agency’s action must be consistent with the agency’s 
statutory mandate.107 Within this domain, they argue that valid 
 
 100. Watts, supra note 4, at 84. 
 101. Id. at 52. Professor Watts includes within the purview of “certain political influences” 
those that flow from Congress as well as from the president. Her article’s dominant focus, 
however, is on the implications of presidential influence and the article is situated within the 
theoretical literature on presidential control. Id. at 8–9. It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
address the suggestion that influences from individual members of Congress might warrant 
heightened judicial deference toward agency actions. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1130. 
 105. Id. at 1140–41. 
 106. Id. at 1175. 
 107. See id. at 1142 (“[T]he agency remains bound by the statute.”); Watts, supra note 4, at 
45 (“[F]ederal administrative agencies . . . must act consistent with congressional intent and 
must consider only factors that Congress intended the agency to consider.”). Although both 
scholars see this proviso as an important constraint on the executive’s “unfettered discretion to 
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political reasons must be public-regarding and must reflect the value 
choices of the administration. Professor Watts says that legitimate 
political influences should embody “some kind of ‘public value’”108 or 
be based on “political considerations tied to policy choices.”109 
Professor Mendelson similarly suggests that courts should defer to 
political reasons that represent “value preferences or policy calls.”110 
Critically, both scholars stress that not all types of political 
reasons are legitimate. Professor Watts, for instance, would exclude 
“raw politics, crass political horse trading, or pure partisanship” from 
preferential treatment on judicial review.111 And Professor Mendelson 
elaborates that courts should reject political influence as a 
justification for administrative action if it (1) advances the personal 
interests of the intervening politician or the narrow agenda of some 
special-interest group,112 (2) pressures the agency to go beyond the 
agency’s statutory bounds,113 or (3) pressures the agency to disregard 
facts that the agency has found114 or to find facts in a way that favor a 
preordained policy prescription.115 
Applying these heuristics, Professor Watts argues that it would 
be illegitimate for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
justify its revocation of a preemption regulation based on the 
following reason: “The President directed us to rescind the 
 
direct the outcome of an agency’s decision,” Watts, supra note 4, at 55; see also Mendelson, 
supra note 4, at 1134 (noting that these constraints “protect . . . rule-of-law values”), neither 
considers the adequacy of this constraint in light of the Chevron doctrine, which arguably makes 
administrative agencies the primary arbiters of these statutory boundaries, see Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 108. Watts, supra note 4, at 53. 
 109. Id. at 54. 
 110. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1171. 
 111. Watts, supra note 4, at 54.  
 112. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1144. The precise overlap between these articulations of 
what constitutes a valid political reason and Justice Scalia’s articulation in Fox is not clear. The 
most significant issue raised by Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion is when reasons based on values 
should trump reasons based on empirical evidence. Although both Professor Watts and 
Professor Mendelson maintain that political pressures would be invalid if they caused an agency 
to disregard or alter the facts, neither addresses how and where the line between fact-based and 
value-based determinations should be drawn in an already politicized administrative 
environment in which the two are often blurred. 
 113. Id. at 1141. It is not clear how significant this limitation is under a Chevron regime that 
gives agencies significant latitude to define precisely what those statutory bounds are. 
 114. Id. at 1142. 
 115. Id. at 1143. 
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preemption regulations in order to reward the trial lawyers, who 
provided significant campaign support to the President.”116 Similarly, 
she argues, “an agency’s assertion that it adopted a particular 
standard . . . because ‘the President made us do it’ should not fare any 
better.”117 The first political reason fails, presumably, because it 
reflects “raw politics” or “crass political horse trading.”118 The second 
fails because it does not contain any “public-regarding,”119 values-
based justification for the president’s policy directive.120 By contrast, a 
valid political reason would look something like the following: In 
justifying an action like its 2009 endangerment finding under the 
Clean Air Act,121 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might 
state, “Our conclusion that carbon dioxide emissions endanger the 
public health and welfare serves the President’s overarching policy 
goal of protecting the environment and is consistent with the 
President’s foreign policy initiatives, including his promises to foreign 
leaders that he will work to combat global warming to the extent 
possible.”122 This political reason would qualify because it invokes the 
broad purposes of the EPA’s statutory scheme and situates the 
president’s policy choice in terms of public values recognized by the 
statute. 
Significantly, these models of political reason giving lodge the 
primary responsibility for developing and articulating the substantive 
reasons for administrative action with the president rather than with 
the agency. In the EPA example, the importance of protecting the 
environment and fostering good foreign relations is a justification 
articulated, in the first instance, by the president. These reasons are 
merely cited by the agency as support for its reliance on the 
president’s authority. The model envisions no independent role for 
the agency in developing public-regarding political reasons. This 
structure of reason giving is very different from the rationalist 
paradigm, in which an agency is an active participant in developing 
the justifications for its actions. Although no proponent of political 
reasons professes to accept as valid an agency’s statement that “the 
 
 116. Watts, supra note 4, at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Id. at 55. 
 118. Id. at 54. 
 119. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1168. 
 120. See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1165. 
 121. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 122. Watts, supra note 4, at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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president made me do it,” a political reason is, at base, a citation by 
the agency to the authority of the president, albeit one based on the 
good reasons that the president has articulated. In the remainder of 
this Article, reasons structured in this way are called “political” 
reasons. Reasons based on other sources of authority—legal or 
deductive reasoning, empirical evidence, policy analysis, or expertise, 
for instance—are encompassed by the “rational” reason-giving 
paradigm. 
III.  THEORIZING POLITICAL REASON GIVING 
Although Professors Watts and Mendelson detail the potential 
doctrinal and policy benefits that would follow from political reason 
giving, they fail to address deeper questions about the function of 
reasons and reason giving in the administrative process. They do not 
engage with existing rationalist theories of reason giving, and perhaps 
more troubling, they fail to articulate their own coherent theory of 
administrative reason giving. In this Part, I identify and outline two 
theoretical frameworks that seem to have inspired, and that might 
arguably accommodate, models of political reason giving—
presidential-control theory and information-disclosure theory—and I 
explain why neither provides adequate justification for deference to 
political reasons. 
A. Presidential-Control Theory 
Paving the way for the political turn in administrative reason 
giving was a political turn—or, more precisely, a presidential turn—in 
theories about the control and legitimation of the bureaucracy. 
Presidentialism is rooted in unitary-executive theory, which emerged 
in its modern guise in the 1980s as President Reagan attempted to 
take the reins of a sprawling bureaucracy whose denizens were often 
at odds with his policy preferences.123 Since then, three major strands 
of presidential-control theory have developed. The first argues that 
strict presidential control of the bureaucracy is constitutionally 
compelled.124 The second argues that, even if not constitutionally 
 
 123. See Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 315–18 (2010) (describing President Reagan’s presidentialism as the “weak 
theory of the unitary executive”). 
 124. E.g., STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 14–15 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549–50 
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compelled, strict presidential control of the bureaucracy is 
normatively desirable.125 The third argues that strict presidential 
control of the bureaucracy is simply an empirical fact that 
administrative-law doctrine must accommodate.126 This Section 
reviews each of these positions and draws out the complex 
relationship between presidentialism and political reason giving. I 
conclude that presidential-control theory does not compel political 
reason giving and arguably does not even support it. 
1. Different Strands of Presidential-Control Theory.  Unitary-
executive theory holds that the Constitution compels the president’s 
authority to control personnel and policy in administrative agencies.127 
Under this view, the president has the constitutional authority to 
remove executive officers—and perhaps even civil-service employees 
in the executive branch—from their positions if they refuse to comply 
with the president’s policy directives.128 Unitary-executive theory also 
posits that independent agencies are unconstitutional because, under 
the theory, Congress has no authority to assign executive powers to a 
body that is outside the plenary control of the president.129 
Although many have questioned claims that the Constitution 
compels this kind of presidential control over administration,130 some 
 
(1994); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary 
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 730 (2005). 
 125. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 8, at 2252 (“[I]n comparison with other forms of control, 
the new presidentialization of administration renders the bureaucratic sphere more transparent 
and responsive to the public, while also better promoting important kinds of regulatory 
competence and dynamism.”). 
 126. See, e.g., id. at 2246 (“We live today in an era of presidential administration.”). 
 127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 128. Tushnet, supra note 123, at 315; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 124, at 597 
(reasoning that Article II, based on structural, historical, and textual arguments, gives the 
president a removal power); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer 
the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 293–96 (2006) (distinguishing between a removal power and 
directive authority over executive officers). 
 129. Tushnet, supra note 123, at 319; see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 124, at 4 
(“[C]ongressional efforts to insulate executive branch subordinates from presidential control by 
creating independent agencies and counsels are in essence unconstitutional.”). 
 130. E.g., JOHN P. MACKENZIE, ABSOLUTE POWER: HOW THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
THEORY IS UNDERMINING THE CONSTITUTION 55 (2008) (arguing that the unitary executive is 
not constitutionally compelled); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 689, 769 (2008) (arguing that, outside the military context, the Constitution does 
not compel a unitary conception of the executive); Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive: 
Ideology Versus the Constitution, in THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND THE MODERN 
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have argued that such control is nonetheless normatively desirable 
given the immense power exercised by contemporary regulatory 
agencies and the imperative to legitimate its exercise. Professors 
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, for instance, argue that the 
values embodied in the Constitution’s institutional design—in 
particular, political accountability and the avoidance of 
factionalism—are best served in the contemporary administrative 
state by strong presidential control over agencies.131 Then-Professor 
Kagan similarly argues that presidential control makes agencies both 
more effective and more accountable to the public, a result that 
enhances their legitimacy.132 
A third strand of presidentialist argument asserts that regardless 
whether the president legally must or normatively should control the 
bureaucracy, for all intents and purposes, he does. Then-Professor 
Kagan was the first to announce that “[w]e live today in an era of 
presidential administration.”133 Professor David Barron has argued 
that, since the 1980s, presidents have taken control of the bureaucracy 
through the political appointment process.134 And Professors Eric 
Posner and Adrian Vermeule suggest that at the dawn of the twenty-
first century, Americans live in a postliberal world of administered 
governance, one in which presidential electoral politics provides the 
only meaningful mechanism constraining the actions of the executive 
branch.135 
2. Presidential-Control Theory and Political Reason Giving.  The 
models of political reason giving proffered by Professors Watts and 
Mendelson, as well as the one suggested by Justice Scalia in Fox, are 
all deeply influenced by presidential-control theory. Justice Scalia has 
been the Court’s most outspoken proponent of unitary-executive 
 
PRESIDENCY 17, 17 (Ryan J. Barilleaux & Christopher S. Kelley eds., 2010) (“Although the 
framers looked to the president to provide responsibility, accountability, and unity, the model of 
the unitary executive was never adopted or intended . . . .”). 
 131. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). 
 132. Kagan, supra note 8, at 2331–46. 
 133. Id. at 2246. 
 134. See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an 
Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2008). 
 135. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 113–14 (2010) (“[T]he system of elections, the party system, and 
American political culture constrain the executive far more than do legal rules created by 
Congress or the courts . . . .”). 
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theory,136 and his opinion in Fox reflects a deeply antagonistic attitude 
toward interference with executive prerogatives.137 Professor Watts 
asserts that the prevailing justification for administrative agencies in 
the U.S. regulatory state has shifted from an “outmoded” expertise-
based model to a “more current” politically based model typified by 
presidential-control theories, and she suggests that administrative 
review should adjust to reflect these changes.138 Professor Mendelson 
likewise starts from the premises that presidents can and do exercise a 
great deal of control over the bureaucracy and that executive control 
has been asserted as a basis for administrative legitimacy.139 
If the presidentialists are correct that presidential control is 
becoming increasingly important as an empirical fact and as a basis 
for legitimating agency action, it would seem to follow that 
administrative law should reflect these changes.140 What is not clear is 
 
 136. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(explaining the fundamental importance of presidential power in the U.S. constitutional scheme 
and detailing how the independent-counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 601–602, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–74 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 
591–598 (2006)), infringed on this power). 
 137. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1817 (2009) (plurality opinion) 
(“There is no reason to magnify the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless 
Fourth Branch by letting Article III judges—like jackals stealing the lion’s kill—expropriate 
some of the power that Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive.” (citation omitted)). 
 138. Watts, supra note 4, at 33. 
 139. See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over 
Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2456 (2011) (explaining that even scholars who 
argue that the president cannot command an agency to issue regulations “concede that the 
President may oversee and substantially influence agency decisions”). 
 140. Presidential-control theories have much to say about the political nature of 
administration and the president’s role in it, but they say very little about what those realities 
imply for administrative law outside of a few narrow areas. The focus of this literature is on the 
president’s ability to control the bureaucracy, primarily through staffing decisions and policy 
directives. Thus, discussions of administrative law in this literature are confined largely to the 
scope of the president’s constitutional or statutory authority to direct policy, e.g., Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 124, at 549–50; Kagan, supra note 8, at 2319; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 
131, at 2–3; Mendelson, supra note 139, at 2455; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? 
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 696 (2007); Yoo et al., supra 
note 123, at 730, the scope of the president’s appointment and removal powers, e.g., CALABRESI 
& YOO, supra note 124; Yoo et al., supra note 124, and Congress’s authority to insulate 
administrative agencies from presidential influence, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of 
Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19, 19–20; Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 
1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41. Before the political turn described in this Article, only Dean Edley 
and then-Professor, now-Justice Kagan discussed the implications of presidentialism for broader 
principles of administrative law, and these analyses were peripheral to their larger projects and 
thus not fully developed. See, e.g., EDLEY, supra note 98, at 192–93 (arguing that review should 
focus on the quality of the political influences); Kagan, supra note 8, at 2380 (arguing that a 
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whether presidential-control theory supports the practice of political 
reason giving, and the theory’s proponents have made no sustained 
argument explicitly integrating the two or explaining why one should 
follow from the other. Although it is conceivable that such an 
argument could be made, it would be difficult to make a case for 
political reason giving—at least as the practice has been proposed—
based on the premises and normative commitments of presidential-
control theory. Political reason-giving models stray outside the 
traditional province of presidential-control theory. They do not speak 
to the president’s power over policy or bureaucratic personnel, and 
they bracket the relationship between presidential and congressional 
policymaking power. Instead, they address themselves primarily to 
two other governmental institutions: agencies and courts. Specifically, 
they ask agencies to justify their actions in terms of their fidelity to 
presidential policy preferences, and they ask courts to evaluate more 
deferentially agency actions that are so justified. Both demands sit 
uneasily with presidential-control theories. 
a. Agencies as Political Reason Givers.  The first demand, 
directed at agencies, is the less controversial of the two, but it is not 
without complication, especially under models that would require the 
disclosure of political reasons. Such a requirement could divide the 
interests of the agency and the president. Agencies will always want 
deference, but presidents may not always want the politics of their 
decisions revealed.141 If the president has the power to direct agencies 
to adopt particular policies, as presidentialists assert,142 it seems clear 
that he also has the power to order agencies to make explicit the 
political bases for their policy decisions. If, however, the president 
does not wish for political justifications to serve as the basis for 
administrative action, it seems equally clear that he could ask 
agencies to justify their decisions on other grounds, assuming such 
grounds are available. 
A president might prefer one mode of justification to another for 
many reasons. For instance, he might believe, as the rationalists do,143 
 
modified approach to hard-look review could take into account political factors such as 
presidential leadership). 
 141. See Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1758–60 (2009) 
(discussing the presidential preference for secrecy and unitary-executive theory’s support for 
presidential secrecy). 
 142. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra Part I.B.  
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that rational justification can build consensus around a policy, 
promoting compliance and thus easing agency enforcement burdens. 
The president might be promoting a policy because he has been 
persuaded by the rational case for it and thinks the public will be 
persuaded, too. Or his preference for nonpolitical reasons might be 
based on political strategy—perhaps a desire to highlight his role in 
some policies while distancing himself from others. What seems clear, 
from the presidentialist perspective, is that such decisions are entirely 
within the president’s power to make. It defies logic to encourage 
agencies to adopt political justifications in the name of enhancing 
executive control when political justifications might turn out to be 
contrary to the president’s wishes. 
b. Judicial Deference to Legitimate Political Reasons.  More 
vexing still is the demand that courts give greater deference to agency 
decisions that have been justified in legitimate political terms. 
Presidential-control theory provides little guidance in this area, as 
presidentialists have little to say about courts. Unitary-executive 
theory merely “allocates control within the executive branch; it does 
not entail a particular relationship between the President and the 
courts.”144 Although those who support presidentialism on normative 
grounds advocate deferential judicial review of administrative 
actions—presumably on the ground that such review will encourage 
the kind of presidential control they see as desirable145—this 
proposition has operated as a kind of background assumption in the 
literature, one that is unsupported by detailed analysis of the 
relationship between courts and the president in the administrative 
state. Finally, those who see presidential control of the bureaucracy as 
an established fact have quite divergent views on its implications for 
judicial review. These views run from those of then-Professor Kagan, 
who believes that presidential control warrants greater judicial 
deference to administrative actions,146 to those held by other 
 
 144. Stack, supra note 128, at 303. 
 145. See, e.g., EDLEY, supra note 98, at 192–93 (arguing for a deferential standard of review 
for the right kind of political influences); Kagan, supra note 8, at 2380 (arguing for deference 
when political leadership and accountability are clear). 
 146. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2372 (“A sounder version of [Chevron and State Farm] 
doctrines of judicial review would take unapologetic account of the extent of presidential 
involvement in administrative decisions in determining the level of deference to which they are 
entitled.”). 
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prominent scholars who argue that it counsels greater judicial scrutiny 
of administrative actions.147 
In sum, the existing body of literature contains no clear 
indication as to how courts should treat administrative actions that 
are the product of presidential control. This uncertainty places a 
significant, and as-yet unmet, burden on proponents of political 
reason giving to explain why presidential-control theory supports the 
kind of relationship they advocate between courts and agencies. 
Although this Article does not purport to offer a definitive case 
against political reason giving on the ground of presidential control, 
making such a case might be difficult for three reasons. 
First, models of political reason giving shift the onus for giving 
reasons for administrative action from the agency to the president. As 
discussed in Part II.B, under the political reason-giving paradigm, 
agencies justify their actions based on citations to the authority of the 
president, as supported by his articulation of legitimate reasons for 
his invocation of that authority. Professor Mendelson defines political 
reasons as “those contributed by . . . the President” as well as “White 
House officials entrusted with regulatory oversight,” on the theory 
that these high-level staff members’ views “are highly likely to reflect 
the President’s positions.”148 Similarly, Professor Watts argues that 
executive influence that deserves deference comprises presidential 
directives and private communications as well as directives from 
other high-level White House staff presumed to speak for the 
president.149 Thus, if courts are to review political reasons to assess 
whether those reasons support agency action, they will be reviewing 
reasons developed by the president—or his immediate staff—and not 
by an agency.150 
 
 147. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 134, at 1137 (suggesting the need for more stringent review 
of agency actions through doctrines that force agencies “to bring their scientific expertise to 
bear on controversial questions”); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of 
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (arguing that in an era of 
presidential administration, Americans must make a greater effort to check the president’s 
power). 
 148. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1128–29. 
 149. Watts, supra note 4, at 57–62. 
 150. The fact that the agency has adopted the president’s reasons as its own should not 
change this analysis. As discussed in Part II.B, an agency’s invocation of the president’s reasons 
is ultimately to justify its acquiescence to his authority. This is different from the adoption by an 
agency of reasoning from other nonpresidential sources, such as comments submitted in 
rulemaking, for instance. Because the agency’s adoption of presidential reasons implicates the 
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Setting aside the violence this arrangement would do to 
foundational administrative-law doctrine,151 the prospect of courts 
reviewing reasons developed by the president is highly problematic 
from the perspective of presidential-control theory. In Franklin v. 
Massachusetts,152 the Court held that the APA does not permit review 
of the president’s actions because the president is not an “agency” 
made subject to the APA’s requirements.153 Concurring in that case, 
Justice Scalia wrote that “[i]t is incompatible with [the president’s] 
constitutional position that he be compelled personally to defend his 
executive actions before a court.”154 Although proponents of political 
reason giving do not contemplate that the president would be called 
upon personally to defend the reasons behind his administrative 
policies, judicial review of such reasons raises the same kinds of 
concerns as does judicial review of the president’s actions directly. 
In Dalton v. Specter,155 the Court similarly refrained from 
reviewing presidential approval of military-base closures pursuant to 
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.156 The Court 
reaffirmed its holding in Franklin that the APA does not apply to 
presidential action and further held that the Court cannot review 
presidential exercises of statutory discretion.157 “How the President 
chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him,” the 
majority commented, “is not a matter for our review.”158 A 
cornerstone of presidential-control theory is the notion that the 
president has the discretion, pursuant to statutes delegating power to 
administrative agencies, to gap-fill for the purpose of executing a 
 
exercise of presidential authority, political reason giving raises issues analogous to those raised 
in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), and Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). 
 151. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (holding that “an administrative 
order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers 
were those upon which its actions can be sustained”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional 
Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 955 (2007) (arguing that Chenery established the 
bedrock principle of administrative law that the validity of agency action turns on the validity of 
the contemporaneous justification the agency has supplied for that action). 
 152. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
 153. Id. at 801. 
 154. Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 155. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). 
 156. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, tit. XXIX, pt. 
A, 104 Stat. 1808 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)).  
 157. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 470. 
 158. Id. at 476. 
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statutory scheme159 and to issue policy directives ordering agencies to 
exercise their discretion under their respective statutory schemes in a 
particular way.160 Whether based on constitutional161 or statutory162 
interpretation, this premise is foundational to establishing the 
president’s power to control the bureaucracy. Under either view, the 
president’s directives to agency administrators represent an exercise 
of his statutory discretion. Consequently, those directives are 
arguably unreviewable under Dalton. 
Second, even if the reasons for presidential actions, as opposed 
to the actions themselves, are reviewable, the prospect of courts’ 
passing on the legitimacy of such reasons would undermine the 
normative foundations of presidential-control theory. Models of 
political reason giving are quite explicit that courts should defer not 
to all political reasons, but only to legitimate political reasons. These 
models instruct courts to accept political reasons that reflect “public 
values”163 or “value preferences or policy calls”164 but to reject those 
that reflect “raw politics, crass political horse trading, or pure 
partisanship”165 and those that “slant[] or ignor[e] the results of a 
scientific or technical analysis.”166 But presidential-control theory 
provides no support for the proposition that courts should pass on the 
legitimacy of the president’s reasons for executive action. To the 
contrary, it suggests that “any constitutionally permissible policy 
decision by an administrative agency that is consistent with its 
governing statute and supported by the President should be upheld by 
the judiciary.”167 
 
 159. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006) (describing “the President’s authority to prescribe incidental details 
needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of any congressional 
authorization to complete that scheme” as “the President’s completion power”). 
 160. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2302–06 (describing how President Clinton used policy 
directives to effectively influence agency healthcare and firearm policies). 
 161. E.g., Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 159, at 2303–04. 
 162. E.g., Kagan, supra note 8, at 2251 (“I argue that a statutory delegation to an executive 
agency official—although not to an independent agency head—usually should be read as 
allowing the President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated 
discretion.”); Mendelson, supra note 139, at 2462.  
 163. Watts, supra note 4, at 53.  
 164. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1171. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1172.  
 167. Staszewski, supra note 18, at 873. 
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Finally, and also contrary to the normative thrust of presidential-
control theory, models of political reason giving ignore fundamental 
constitutional separation-of-powers principles. Although presidential-
control theories are themselves concerned with the power and 
authority of the president, their broader concern is the preservation 
of constitutional structures that protect the separation of powers.168 
To effectuate a balanced system of governmental power, the 
Constitution allocates authority not only to the president but also to 
Congress and the courts. Among other powers, the Constitution 
confers on Congress the power to create lower federal courts169 and to 
define their jurisdiction.170 This power includes the ability to specify 
the scope of judicial review of actions taken pursuant to statutes.171 
Thus, it is impossible to determine how courts should or should not 
assess political reasons without first considering precisely what 
latitude Congress has given them to review agency actions. 
Congress has given the federal courts jurisdiction to review 
agency actions under the APA172 and has defined, in the same statute, 
the standard under which courts are to review agencies’ policy 
decisions. Specifically, courts are to “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”173 Proponents of political reason giving do not deny that 
reviewing courts must act within these statutory bounds. But they fail 
to explain how deferring to political reasons for agency action 
comports with courts’ statutorily conferred review authority. Courts 
 
 168. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 131, at 4 (arguing that a unitary conception of 
the executive should be adopted because it is the most faithful way to translate the Framers’ 
structure into a radically changed contemporary political context). 
 169. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested 
in . . . such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 170. Id. art. III, § 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have 
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make.”); see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 
(1850) (“Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute 
confers. . . . The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States, 
but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised by [the lower courts]; consequently, the 
statute which does prescribe the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be in conflict with the 
Constitution, unless it confers powers not enumerated therein.”). 
 171. Granted, the Constitution may require a different standard of review—for instance, 
concerning actions alleged to violate the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, the Equal 
Protection Clause, id. amend. XIV, § 1, or the First Amendment, id. amend. 1. 
 172. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).  
 173. Id. § 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
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are obliged under the APA’s review standard to set aside agency 
actions that are arbitrary or capricious, meaning that they may uphold 
only those agency actions that are neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
It is not clear how political reasons would assist courts in 
dispatching their statutory duty to determine whether an agency 
action has surpassed the mandatory threshold of nonarbitrariness. In 
fact, politically motivated decisions are often the very definition of 
arbitrariness. Presidential policy directives, especially those that 
might be insulated from judicial review, depend on the president’s 
“individual discretion”174 and do not “adhere to any set scheme” for 
deciding what policies to adopt.175 Often they are “not supported” by 
evidence or rational argument.176 Political reasons for agency 
decisions may give those decisions many salutary qualities. What they 
do not do is render those decisions nonarbitrary. If an agency’s 
decision is arbitrary and capricious, the idea that courts may 
nonetheless defer to it in defiance of their congressionally conferred 
authority is constitutionally suspect. 
In sum, political reason giving, as conceptualized by its 
proponents, is arguably incompatible with the presidential-control 
theories in which it purports to ground itself. To be sure, I do not 
dismiss as impossible the project of making a case for presidential 
control as a motivating theory of political reason giving. This Article 
merely seeks to demonstrate the difficulties that accompany making 
such a case and to highlight the absence of any serious attempt to 
address these issues. Granted, this line of critique is only applicable if 
models of political reason giving do, in fact, rest on presidential-
control theory. Proponents of these models may cite presidential-
control theory as a referent and a motivation, but it is not entirely 
clear that enhancing presidential control is political reason giving’s 
normative aim. 
As this discussion suggests, models of political reason giving 
might be viewed, instead, as subversive of presidential control, 
conferring a new source of leverage on agencies that could be used 
against the president and subjecting the president’s policy decisions 
and political justifications to judicial scrutiny. Professor Mendelson’s 
political reason-giving requirement, in particular, is arguably 
 
 174. Cf. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 64 (11th ed. 2004) (defining the word 
“arbitrary” as “depending on individual discretion”). 
 175. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 486 (2011). 
 176. Id. at 490. 
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structured as a challenge to theories of presidential control.177 
Professor Mendelson suggests that it might be necessary to obtain a 
better account of what presidential supervision actually entails before 
definitively adopting the story that such supervision lends needed 
legitimacy to administrative agencies.178 Perhaps, despite the language 
of presidential control that frames political reason-giving proposals, 
what they actually seek to induce through political reason giving is 
the disclosure of information about the nature of the president’s 
control over the bureaucracy, with the ultimate end of undermining it. 
In the next Section, I evaluate political reason giving as a strategy for 
forcing the revelation of this kind of information. 
B. Information-Disclosure Theory 
Information-disclosure theory provides another possible 
theoretical basis for models of political reason giving. Although their 
proponents do not explicitly characterize them as such, these models 
are designed and justified much like common forms of information-
disclosure regulation, and the revelation of information about the 
political bases for administrative decisions appears to be their 
primary normative aim. Both Professor Watts and Professor 
Mendelson express deep concerns about the “transparency” of the 
administrative process.179 This concern verges on suspicion that 
agencies are not only opaque but that they are also obfuscating the 
real reasons for their actions. Agencies are said to “couch their 
decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, . . . hiding 
political influences that factor into the mix.”180 Rationalist reasons are 
said to be “façades”181 that have “submerged”182 the real reasons for 
agency action. Putting aside for the moment whether such suspicions 
are warranted, this Section examines whether an information-
 
 177. Professor Mendelson’s requirement perhaps challenges, for example, then-Professor, 
now-Justice Kagan’s view in Presidential Administration, supra note 8. 
 178. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1141 (“[W]hether presidential influence is a negative 
influence on agency decision making, rather than, on another view, the main force shoring up 
the administrative state, largely turns on the likely content of that influence, about which we do 
not currently possess sufficient information.”). 
 179. See id. at 1130 (arguing that transparency will increase political accountability and 
reduce inappropriate executive influence); Watts, supra note 4, at 33 (arguing that disclosure of 
political influences will increase transparency and lead to greater accountability).  
 180. Watts, supra note 4, at 23. 
 181. Id. at 42. 
 182. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1163. 
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disclosure regime of the type embodied in political reason-giving 
models is likely to reveal the true basis for administrative actions. 
Information-disclosure regulation has long been used as a 
strategy to force parties to reveal information about themselves that 
they might otherwise prefer to conceal.183 The first generation of 
information-disclosure policy in the United States grew out of “right-
to-know” movements in the 1960s and 1970s that sought more 
openness and less secrecy in government.184 Right-to-know laws 
sought to inform the public about the workings of government and 
typically required simply that the government make existing 
documents and activities publicly available.185 As experience with 
disclosure regulation developed, the regulation became much more 
targeted in its design. Its goals shifted from merely informing the 
public to using information as a vehicle for shaping individual 
behavior to comport with regulatory goals.186 Targeted information-
disclosure regulation seeks to provide individuals with information 
that will steer their choices toward a particular desired regulatory 
outcome without explicitly mandating the outcome. So, for instance, 
nutrition labels seek to promote healthier diets by giving people the 
information they need to select healthier food. Targeted information-
disclosure strategies have been employed in a wide range of 
regulatory arenas, from health and safety hazards187 to financial risk,188 
with varying degrees of success. 
 
 183. See Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 449, 460–65 (2012) (stating that “purpose-based” laws achieve this objective). 
 184. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS 
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 24–28 (2007). 
 185. Id. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), and the Government in the 
Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006), are both examples of right-to-know laws. 
 186. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 39 (“[W]hereas right-to-know policies aim to 
generally inform public discourse, targeted transparency aims to influence specific choices.”).  
 187. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2006) (requiring retailers of covered commodities to inform 
consumers of a commodity’s country of origin); 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006) (requiring colleges 
and universities to report crime statistics for the previous three years and to describe their 
crime-prevention programs and procedures for handling sex crimes); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11023(g)(1)(C)(iii)–(iv) (2006) (requiring regulated facilities to report annually the total 
amounts of regulated chemicals released into the air, soil, surface water, and offsite locations); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West Supp. 2012) (requiring any person in the 
course of business to give a warning if she is aware that an individual will be exposed to a 
chemical known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2011) (requiring 
nutrition labeling on food packaging). 
 188. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2011) (providing that a solicitation cannot be made 
without first disclosing all relevant information to all shareholders). 
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Like other models of information-disclosure regulation, models 
of political reason giving either require or incentivize agencies to 
reveal information that they might prefer to conceal: the political 
bases for their action. Professor Watts’s model rewards agencies with 
greater judicial deference for disclosing the public-regarding political 
bases of their actions.189 Professor Mendelson envisions a mandatory-
disclosure model that would require agencies to reveal all executive 
political influences on their actions but that would reward them if 
these influences, taken together, reflected the administration’s value 
preferences or policy calls.190 Information-disclosure regulation can be 
evaluated along three dimensions. First, is the disclosure design likely 
to change the behavior of information receivers and disclosers in the 
desired way? Second, irrespective of whether it will shape behavior, is 
it likely to provide good information or to tell us something that is 
both hidden and true about the administrative process? Finally, will 
the disclosure design produce any perverse or unintended effects that 
might outweigh its benefits? 
1. Disclosure of Political Reasons Is Unlikely To Change 
Behavior.  Political reason-giving models are poorly designed to 
shape behavior toward targeted ends. Much research has been 
conducted on information-disclosure regulation, resulting in a 
sophisticated understanding of the factors that tend to lead to such 
regulation’s success or failure. Well-designed information-disclosure 
regulation generally has five characteristics: (1) a specified policy 
purpose or problem to be solved by disclosure, (2) specified 
disclosure targets, (3) a specified scope of information, (4) a defined 
information structure and vehicle, and (5) an enforcement 
mechanism.191 In addition, to shape behavior successfully, the 
disclosures made under the regulation must become embedded in the 
decisionmaking routines of both information receivers and 
information disclosers.192 
Although Professors Watts and Mendelson clearly articulate a 
policy purpose for political reason giving, their models are not 
 
 189. See Watts, supra note 4, at 13 (arguing for courts openly to credit political judgments in 
their reviews, enabling them to defer more readily to agency decisions). 
 190. See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1163 (arguing for increasing political accountability by 
requiring disclosure). 
 191. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 39. 
 192. Id. at 54–55. 
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designed to achieve it. The policy purpose of these models is to 
enhance the accountability of the political actors who ostensibly 
control administrative agencies.193 Professor Watts suggests that 
arbitrary-and-capricious review’s focus on the scientific, technical, 
and statutory factors that influence agency decisions tends to mask 
the political factors at work in these decisions, obscuring political 
responsibility for agency decisions.194 Professor Watts contends that 
political reason giving can empower citizens to monitor the political 
influences on agencies and, presumably, to hold democratically 
elected politicians accountable for the choices that they impose on 
agencies.195 Professor Mendelson similarly argues that political reason 
giving would make the president more accountable to the electorate. 
Forcing agencies to disclose the policy preferences imposed on them 
by the executive will prevent presidents from transferring blame for 
unpopular decisions onto “an unelected agency official.”196 Instead, 
the electorate will “see the value-laden aspects of the [agency’s] 
decision as a reflection of presidential preferences,”197 enabling voters 
to judge the president on the merits of his policy preferences. 
Both Professor Watts and Professor Mendelson suggest that 
these accountability enhancements would occur through a 
straightforward mechanism: Political reasons will tether the president 
more closely to the actions he directs agencies to take. This tethering 
effect, in turn, will allow the electorate to hold him responsible at the 
ballot box for these actions. The prospect of electoral discipline will 
shape the president’s behavior while in office, thereby prompting him 
to promote policies that the electorate supports.198 Unfortunately, 
political reason-giving models are unlikely to promote this behavioral 
cycle. 
The first significant design defect in these models is their 
confusion over the disclosure targets for the information contained in 
political reasons. If models of political reason giving seek ultimately 
 
 193. See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1161 (discussing the virtues of “greater disclosure to 
the electorate”); Watts, supra note 4, at 42 (calling enhanced political accountability “perhaps 
the most important reason” for political reason giving). 
 194. See Watts, supra note 4, at 43 (suggesting that political reason giving could reduce the 
“monitoring gap” that often thwarts the detection of political influence on agency decisions). 
 195. See id. (explaining the “accountability benefits” that would ensue from disclosure). 
 196. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1165. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1163–66 (explaining how agencies could become more politically accountable 
through greater disclosure of their influences); Watts, supra note 4, at 42–44 (same). 
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to shape the behavior of voters, one would think that citizens would 
be the target audience for this information. But the disclosure format 
envisioned—in the Federal Register, along with all of the agency’s 
other reasons for a given action—is highly unlikely to reach this 
audience. Although Federal Register publication would make political 
reasons publicly available as a formal matter, as a practical matter it 
would mean that those reasons never reach the vast majority of 
citizens. To state the obvious, “[d]isclosees cannot use information 
until they get it.”199 Courts represent another possible target of 
political reasons, but it is not clear that the receipt of political reasons 
by courts for purposes of arbitrary-and-capricious review will have 
any effect on the behavior of voters. And the models do not theorize 
the mechanism through which courts might serve as an information 
intermediary for the citizens who are to hold politicians accountable 
for their regulatory policies. 
Of course, watchdog groups and the media might monitor the 
Federal Register and court dockets, much as they already do,200 and 
report political-influence disclosures to the public. But they would 
necessarily do so selectively, depriving citizens of a full picture of 
presidential influence and perhaps unfairly characterizing the nature 
of that influence. Moreover, as commentators point out, “[T]he 
conditions under which such groups form and become engaged as 
agents of information users are often very demanding”201—these 
groups often form in times of crisis, and public attention generally 
fades as soon as the crisis is over202—so it cannot be assumed that such 
groups will serve as effective information intermediaries. At the very 
least, the potential influence of political disclosures will be blunted by 
the fact that whatever information reaches citizen-targets will not 
reach them directly, but will first be filtered through some third party. 
This confusion around a fundamental design element seriously 
undermines the ability of information-disclosure policies to shape 
behavior. “Successful transparency policies . . . place the individuals 
and groups who will use information at center stage,”203 but the 
 
 199. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 647, 709 (2011). 
 200. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 42 (explaining the role of intermediary groups in 
compelling risk disclosure). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. at 106, 110 (describing the crisis-driven formation of information 
intermediaries). 
 203.  Id. at 11. 
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citizens who ostensibly drive the electoral-discipline mechanism 
underlying Professor Watts’s and Professor Mendelson’s envisioned 
policies do not even appear to be in the theater. 
Even if citizens do ultimately receive the information contained 
in the political reasons that are provided by agencies, that 
information will shape their electoral choices only if it becomes 
embedded in their decisionmaking routines. Information is most 
likely to embed itself when three conditions are present. First, 
receivers must perceive the benefit of getting the information.204 
Second, the information must be disclosed in a way that is compatible 
with the way people typically make decisions.205 Third, receivers must 
be able to comprehend the information disclosed and, specifically, “to 
relate it to the decisions they face.”206 
Political reason giving meets none of these criteria. First, there 
has been no broad public demand for more information about the 
political control of the bureaucracy, much less for information about 
the intricacies of, say, review by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). People tend to make political, and 
especially presidential, decisions based on much different criteria.207 
That voters desire the kind of information contemplated by 
Professors Watts and Mendelson is not at all clear.208 
Second, disclosure in the Federal Register is likely to be remote 
in time from when most citizens are focused on electoral decisions 
 
 204. See id. at 55 (“Few people spend time and energy obtaining information for its own 
sake. Most people must perceive that the information will be valuable in achieving their 
goals.”). 
 205. Id. at 56. 
 206. Id. at 59. 
 207. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND 
CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that political preferences are determined by 
deeply ingrained cognitive structures that can be triggered by political rhetoric); DREW 
WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE 
NATION (2007) (providing evidence from clinical-psychology research on the emotional basis of 
political decisionmaking).  
 208. Although it is true that the media have demanded information in certain high-profile, 
politicized administrative decisions, such as OIRA’s refusal to open an e-mail from EPA 
regarding its greenhouse-gas-endangerment finding during President George W. Bush’s 
administration or President Barack Obama’s request that the EPA withdraw its final National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard for ozone pollution, it is not clear that the catalyst for these 
demands was voting citizens. Moreover, even if the demand is citizen-driven, the fact that events 
such as these have been widely reported in the popular press suggests that the information is 
available and is being disseminated in fora that are far more accessible to citizens than court 
filings or Federal Register notices. 
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and remote from the location where they actually cast their votes. 
Disclosed information is most likely to shape behavior when it is 
made “available at a time and place where users are accustomed to 
making decisions.”209 This is why the FDA places nutrition 
information directly on products at the point of purchase rather than 
in some agency archive. By contrast, disclosed political reasons for 
agency actions do not have the same kind of immediacy and 
relevance to voters’ decisions. 
Finally, even if the information encapsulated in political-
influence disclosures were to reach citizens at a time and in a format 
that made it relevant to their voting decisions, they might not 
comprehend either the information itself or its relation to their 
electoral choices. Information receivers in all contexts have difficulty 
understanding the information that is disclosed to them. Many are 
functionally illiterate,210 still more are “innumerate”211—that is, have 
trouble comprehending mathematical and probabilistic information—
and all have a well-catalogued list of inherent cognitive limitations 
that inhibit their ability to make sense of the information they get.212 
These limitations have been observed among receivers of even 
relatively straightforward information, such as the fat content of food 
or the presence of carcinogens in consumer products.213 Information 
about political influences on agency policymaking decisions is vastly 
more complex, not least because, as proponents of political reason 
giving admit, it has no fixed normative valence.214 Unlike carcinogens 
in food, political influence is not self-evidently good or bad, nor is it 
something obviously to be avoided or encouraged. The chance of 
 
 209. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 57. 
 210. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 711.  
 211. Id. at 712; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1440–44 (1999) 
(arguing that consumers do not understand and are often tricked by disclosed numbers); Paul 
Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281 (1987) (arguing that individuals’ nonnumerical 
perceptions of risk affect outcomes). 
 212. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 670 (describing a study that found 
multiple cognitive limitations that rendered disclosure ineffective, including motivations, 
thought processes, and the perceived uncertainties of science); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 211, 
at 1451 (arguing that manufacturers can successfully manipulate perceptions of risk). 
 213. Hanson and Kysar, supra note 211, at 1451, 1467–68; see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 667 
(1993) (observing that, because of the way people process information, risk disclosure can cause 
people to dramatically overestimate risks). 
 214. See supra Part II.B. 
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influencing receiver behavior under these circumstances is 
vanishingly small. 
Even if these barriers could be overcome, one more set of 
daunting conditions must be met for information to create a virtuous 
cycle of behavior: information disclosures must bend the 
decisionmaking curve not only of information receivers but also of 
information providers. The Toxic Release Inventory215 was deemed a 
success not because it prompted neighbors of polluting factories to 
move, but rather because it changed the way that those factories 
measured and managed toxic releases, resulting in significant 
emissions declines.216 Similarly, saccharine labeling was deemed to be 
effective not because wealthy, well-educated consumers understood 
the information and were able to avoid personally ingesting products 
made with the carcinogen but because that powerful group of 
consumers created demand pressure that induced manufacturers to 
reformulate their products.217 
Likewise, the litmus test for political reason giving should be not 
merely whether voters are able to use the information obtained to 
make better electoral decisions and to throw out politicians who 
deviate from electoral preferences each election cycle, but whether 
the prospect of such electoral discipline changes the decisionmaking 
function of politicians while they are in office, making them more 
likely to choose policies that the electorate favors. For this dynamic to 
occur, politicians must perceive and comprehend the altered choices 
of voters and understand those altered choices as responding to 
disclosed information.218 Information-disclosure regulation can 
discipline the behavior of disclosers only if the information disclosed 
ends up “being routinely incorporated into management routines and 
 
 215. The Toxic Release Inventory, created by the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006)), created a publicly available database containing information on 
toxic chemical releases emitted by industrial facilities in the United States. E.g., Am. Chem. 
Council v. Johnson, 406 F.3d 738, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 216. JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, 
AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 230–31 (2005); MICHAEL E. 
KRAFT, MARK STEPHAN & TROY D. ABEL, COMING CLEAN: INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 53–55 (2011). 
 217. See Sunstein, supra note 213, at 664 (“The data show that after the warning labels [for 
diet soft drinks containing saccharin] were required, there were significant adverse effects on 
sales. The initial effects were produced primarily by well-educated and high-income 
households.”). 
 218. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 6. 
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decisionmaking processes.”219 Disclosures must not be merely discrete 
exercises; they must be part of an iterative process that feeds back to 
the disclosing organization, shaping the way that it does business.220 
When the receiver’s response to information is as attenuated as it is in 
this context, it will have little, if any, disciplinary effect on the 
behavior of disclosers. As one source comments, if receivers “respond 
to information in ways that do not directly affect disclosers, the 
behavior of disclosers is unlikely to change.”221 If the information 
provided to the electorate by political reason giving does not change 
politicians’ behavior while they are in office, it will not provide 
accountability in any meaningful sense. 
In sum, the provision by agencies of political reasons for their 
actions is unlikely to affect the behavioral dynamics of presidential 
voting and thus of presidential behavior in office. Of course, even if 
the information provided by political reasons fails to change behavior 
in accountability-enhancing ways, it might still have some inherent 
value, satisfying citizens’ “right to know” what their government is up 
to, in the tradition of “sunshine” policies. Accepting the implicit 
presumption that political motivations for agency action are hidden,222 
the question then becomes whether the disclosure of political reasons 
 
 219. HAMILTON, supra note 216, at 230. 
 220. See KRAFT ET AL., supra note 216, at 31 (“Disclosure of information to the public 
creates a dynamic which spurs industrial facilities to improve their environmental 
performance.”). 
 221. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 66. 
 222. Whether the political reasons that agencies give are likely to tell Americans anything 
they do not already know, at least at some level of abstraction, about political involvement in 
administration is unclear. Ordinary citizens have proven quite capable of attributing 
administrative actions to the political and values-based motives of the president. See, e.g., Molly 
Worthen, Leaps of Faith, N.Y. TIMES, CAMPAIGN STOPS BLOG (Mar. 1, 2012, 10:23 PM), http://
campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/leaps-of-faith (describing how a decision by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to require most nonchurch employers to 
provide their employees with insurance that covers birth control was viewed by many as an 
effort by President Obama to oppress religious expression and undermine religious values in 
favor of his own and his supporters’ secular values). Research has also suggested that citizens’ 
perceptions of the president’s values-based motives for policy already influence their electoral 
decisions, perhaps even more than their economic or material interests. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE 
RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012). An 
agency’s disclosure that a particular decision was influenced in a particular way by the public-
regarding value choices of the sitting administration would add little to the existing levels—or 
accuracy—of public knowledge about political influence, given information-processing and 
comprehension constraints. Worse, a political reason-giving model that credited only public-
regarding political reasons would be unlikely to elicit additional information from agencies 
about the less savory political motivations behind agency actions. 
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for agency action provides citizens with high-quality information that 
reveals something true about the administrative process and the 
president’s role in it. 
2. Disclosure of Political Reasons Is Unlikely To Reveal High-
Quality Information.  Economic theory describes two ways of 
revealing hidden information: disclosure and signaling. Disclosure is 
the direct revelation of hidden information,223 whereas signaling is the 
indirect communication of hidden information through costly 
actions.224 These mechanisms can provide valuable tools for revealing 
hidden information, but only under certain conditions. Disclosure can 
reveal hidden information accurately when revelation is both 
voluntary and costless or when revelation is both mandatory and 
policed by strong enforcement for misrepresentation.225 When these 
conditions are absent, direct revelation of information is likely to be 
no more than “cheap talk,” revealing no information of value, 
especially if preferences are misaligned between the discloser and the 
receiver.226 Signaling, by contrast, seeks to overcome the pitfalls of 
disclosure by directing attention to an actor’s choices or actions—
rather than to her direct statements—to communicate hidden 
information.227 Signaling reveals hidden information effectively when 
the actions taken by “good types” to signal the high quality of their 
products—or the high-mindedness of their motivations—would be 
too costly for “bad types” to imitate.228 
 
 223. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (9th ed. 2009). 
 224. See Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434, 436–39 (2002) 
(illustrating the basic signaling model in the job market, in which a potential employee’s level of 
education is used as a proxy for that potential employee’s future productivity).  
 225. See Robert H. Gertner, Disclosure and Unravelling, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 605, 605–06 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“The 
foundation of the theory of verifiable-information disclosure is the unravelling result. The 
unravelling result is simply that if certain conditions[—including costless information 
transmission—]hold, all verifiable information will be revealed.”). 
 226. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, Cheap Talk, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 751, 751–52 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 227. Id. at 751. 
 228. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 20–21 (2002). In the classic example, used-
car dealers tend to rely on signals rather than disclosure to communicate the truth to consumers 
about the quality of their cars. Because it is difficult for inexpert consumers to confirm the 
veracity of direct claims about auto quality, they tend to rely on the sellers’ actions, such as their 
willingness to offer warranties on their cars, to ascertain its quality. Cf. George Akerlof, The 
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) 
(using the used-car market to illustrate problems posed by asymmetry of information between 
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Political reason giving is a disclosure regime that seeks to induce 
agencies directly to reveal the political bases for their actions. 
Professor Watts’s design is particularly ill suited for producing 
meaningful disclosures. Professor Watts would encourage, but would 
not require, the disclosure of political reasons, by rewarding agencies 
with deference if they disclose political influence truthfully and if the 
disclosed political influence is public-regarding.229 The model contains 
no enforcement mechanism for punishing incomplete or inaccurate 
disclosures. Agencies would be, in essence, invited to disclose good 
information about themselves in exchange for a reward. This 
arrangement would surely create incentives for agencies to offer what 
they might regard as salutary political reasons for their actions, but it 
would offer no incentive for them to disclose less savory political 
reasons for their actions. Political reason giving under this model 
would provide only one side of the story, thus opening the door to a 
cacophony of “cheap talk” about the basis of agency decisions.230 
Professor Mendelson’s mandatory-disclosure model is better 
designed, in theory, to elicit meaningful information. Professor 
Mendelson would require agencies to reveal all executive influences 
on their rulemaking, regardless of whether those influences might be 
perceived as good or bad.231 Her model also contains an enforcement 
mechanism: courts would not uphold rules if these influences had not 
been completely and accurately disclosed.232 
Although mandatory disclosure may avoid reward-driven cheap 
talk, it has its own set of pitfalls. First, disclosers often simply resist or 
ignore mandates,233 especially when enforcement mechanisms are 
weak or uneven. Because courts would have difficulty determining 
whether all relevant executive influence on an agency decision had 
 
the buyer and the seller and observing that warranties can “counteract” the effects of quality 
uncertainty”). 
 229. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 230. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary 
Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing 
that voluntary programs that offer firms rewards for self-regulating are likely to be ineffective). 
Conceivably, courts faced with an ongoing parade of commendable political reasons might 
begin to question those reasons’ veracity, but Professor Watts’s model provides no account of 
the mechanism by which mere questioning might discipline agencies into providing negative 
information about themselves. And the model does not explain or justify the power of judges 
and litigants to inquire into undisclosed political reasons for agency action. 
 231. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 233. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 700. 
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been fully and truthfully disclosed without running up against thorny 
separation-of-powers issues,234 courts are unlikely to be vigorous 
enforcers of that requirement, and agencies might be able to resist it 
with impunity. Second, when a mandate is stated in broad terms, 
disclosers often interpret it—either conservatively or strategically—to 
require the disclosure of every last detail.235 This response produces 
disclosures so detailed and exhaustive that they can be 
unintelligible.236 Third, disclosure mandates are often met with 
creative compliance strategies that put a positive spin on the negative 
facts sought to be disclosed.237 For instance, as Professors Omri Ben-
Shahar and Carl Schneider explain, when health plans were required 
to reveal the basis for incentive payments to their doctors, “‘almost 
none’ mentioned ‘the potential negative impact that incentive 
arrangements might have on physician behavior.’ They more often 
bathed ‘incentives in a positive light’ by saying, for example, that they 
rewarded better care.”238 The political influences on agencies likely 
would be spun in a similar fashion. 
Finally, disclosers often “obey the letter of a mandate but flout 
its spirit,” engaging in symbolic or “[m]echanical compliance.”239 The 
same kind of boilerplate that stands in for meaningful disclosure in a 
 
 234. See Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and 
Political Settlements, 9 J.L. & POL. 719, 719 (1993) (“Executive privilege is based on the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and exempts the executive branch from certain 
disclosure requirements if an exemption is necessary for carrying out important executive 
responsibilities that are part of official government duties.”); see also Stephen C.N. Lilley, 
Suboptimal Executive Privilege, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1127, 1132 (describing the courts’ tendency 
to abstain from disputes over executive privilege). But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
711 (1974) (holding that executive privilege, although “constitutionally based,” does not 
override the right to production of all evidence in a criminal trial). Although United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), did confront the issue of executive privilege, the case is widely relied 
upon to support the assertion that the president’s discussions with advisors are generally 
confidential because of the need for “complete candor and objectivity.” Id. at 706; see also Jay S. 
Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
104 YALE L.J. 51, 110–11 (1994) (quoting the “complete candor and objectivity” language in 
support of the same assertion). 
 235. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 684; see also Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming 
Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2009) (arguing 
that a broad mandate to disclose certain tax-shelter transactions led to overdisclosure by 
taxpayers, hampering Internal Revenue Service enforcement efforts). 
 236. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 686–87. 
 237. See id. at 700 (mentioning ways that disclosers can resist mandates). 
 238. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing 
HMO Physician Incentives, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 227 (2002)). 
 239. Id. at 701. 
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variety of consumer-disclosure arenas might also come to dominate 
the discourse of political reasons. For instance, regulations repealing 
environmental protections, granting trade preferences, promoting 
green energy, enacting federal curriculum standards, or revising 
Medicare coverage could all be justified on the grounds that they 
comport with a president’s public-regarding program to, say, “rebuild 
the foundations of the American economy on the principles of free 
enterprise, hard work, and innovation.”240 An administration will 
always be able to conjure some broad, public-regarding principle for 
its policy preferences, but this principle will likely do little to convey 
the real politics behind any particular decision. The recitation of 
political platitudes in support of administrative policies would 
seriously undermine the goal of enhancing meaningful political 
discourse and accountability. 
3. Disclosure of Political Reasons May Have Unintended Costs.  
Even if political reason giving is not optimally designed to produce 
the desired information, one might argue that it will produce some 
amount of new information—albeit of varying quality—and that more 
information is always better than less information. In considering 
whether to seek disclosure of this additional information, 
policymakers should consider what the costs of obtaining it might be. 
First, as Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider observe, new 
sources of information “can crowd out useful information” that 
already exists.241 Information disclosers have finite information-
generation and disclosure capacities. Thus, a directive to focus on the 
political reasons for agency action may shift resources away from the 
production of information about other reasons supporting agency 
action. 
Second, information receivers similarly have finite information-
retention and processing abilities, and new disclosures may prevent 
them from acquiring or comprehending other information that may 
turn out to be more important.242 Political reasons seem especially 
likely to induce such a crowding-out effect because they are 
 
 240. This particular political platitude was taken from Mitt Romney’s presidential-campaign 
website. Jobs and Economic Growth, ROMNEY: BELIEVE IN AMERICA, http://www.mittromney
.com/jobs (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
 241. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 737 (emphasis omitted). 
 242. Id.; Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and 
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 566 (2006).  
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inherently more comprehensible than rational reasons. The rational 
reasons given to support agency policy decisions—including policy 
analysis, synthesis of conflicting empirical data, and explanations of 
how different interests have been mediated—can be extraordinarily 
complex and thus difficult to digest and understand. By contrast, a 
statement that the agency has adopted a policy because that policy 
comports with the president’s view of the public interest is a simple 
cause-effect account that is cognitively straightforward to 
comprehend. Given both types of reasons, the one that is simpler and 
more straightforward is the one that is likely to stick.243 Because 
information-processing and retention capacities are limited, the more 
straightforward account is likely to crowd out information contained 
in other accounts. 
These information-processing mechanisms suggest two 
significant problems with political reason giving as an information-
forcing device. First, political reason giving would not generate more 
information about the administrative process; it would generate 
different information about the administrative process. This reality 
raises the question whether the information that political reason 
giving produces is the focal narrative that should be told about 
administrative policymaking. The administrative process is much 
richer and more complex than the political context in which it occurs. 
To focus citizens’ limited cognitive capacities on politics, to the 
possible exclusion of other aspects of the process—such as the 
attempt to translate scientific knowledge into policy insight or the 
struggle to reconcile competing interests or determine what policy 
values are in the interest of the broader society—would both degrade 
policy discourse and diminish the universe of what observers can 
know about administration. Second, the fact that political reasons are 
cognitively simpler to comprehend does not render them any truer or 
more accurate than other kinds of reasons. If the core goal of political 
reasons is simplification, they achieve it admirably. They are less 
likely, however, to reveal deeper truths about the administrative 
process. 
4. Signaling as an Alternative to Disclosure.  None of this 
discussion means that citizens and courts are consigned to ignorance 
 
 243. See Sunstein, supra note 213, at 670–71 (“Excessive detail should be avoided; the 
relevant information should be crisp and simple. Any disclosure requirements should attend to 
difficulties in processing information.”). 
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about the political bases for administrative action. The political 
reason-giving project itself suggests that people know quite a bit 
about the political bases for administrative action, both as a general 
matter and in specific cases. In addition, research suggests that 
existing administrative-law doctrine builds in signals about the level 
of political support for a given administrative action. These signals 
arguably provide more credible information than direct statements 
would about a given policy’s consistency with the president’s policy 
preferences.244 Hard-look review calls upon agencies to disclose the 
rational bases of their actions under penalty of remand if the evidence 
or explanation is insufficient.245 This design is mandatory and contains 
a clear enforcement mechanism. Disclosures made pursuant to this 
regime convey a great deal of information about the logical and 
empirical bases for an agency’s decisions. Moreover, in addition to 
the direct information these reasons provide about the rational bases 
for agency decisions, they also send a signal about the level of 
political support for those decisions. Justifying agency actions in a 
way that will survive hard-look review is, as many have observed, a 
costly endeavor.246 The fact that an agency has invested significant 
 
 244. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency 
Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 470 (2007) (“[T]he effect of the [cost that an agency must 
incur to adopt a new regulation] on agency expertise depends on whether the agency would 
adopt the new regulation if its efforts to acquire additional information are unsuccessful.”); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006) [hereinafter Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory] (arguing 
that “judicially-imposed explanation requirements can help reviewing courts overcome their 
comparative informational disadvantage for reasons that are independent of the (in)ability of 
courts to understand or verify the substantive content of the justifications advanced by 
government decisionmakers” and assuming that “the court can use the quality of the 
government’s explanation . . . as a rough proxy for the costs the government incurred in 
producing this explanation”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information 
Acquisition in Public Law, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 351, 377 (2008) (“Allowing action without 
hard evidence dampens research incentives; allowing action in the presence of adverse evidence 
strengthens research incentives.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and 
Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1427 (2011) (“[D]ifferent institutional 
arrangements (arrangements that are often determined or shaped by law) might affect the 
production of useful information by government agents.”). 
 245. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
 246. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To Modify 
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 498–99 (1997); 
Sidney A. Shapiro, Substantive Reform, Judicial Review, and Agency Resources: OSHA as a 
Case Study, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 645, 652 (1997); see also John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: 
Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 
277, 286 (1992) (“The government has finite resources with which to investigate problems, 
develop regulations, and enforce its decisions. A major regulatory initiative that will have a 
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resources in a decision is likely to indicate not only that the decision 
has been carefully researched and considered and is rationally 
justifiable, but also that it has strong political support. 
Professor Matthew Stephenson demonstrates in formal models 
that the rationalist reason-giving requirement of hard-look review has 
significant information-forcing qualities. In addition to the 
information it conveys by its terms, the requirement signals to 
inexpert, apolitical judges the level of support a policy has received 
from the administration.247 Professor Stephenson argues that an 
agency’s willingness and ability “to produce a high-quality 
explanation signals that the government believes the benefits of the 
proposed policy are high.”248 Moreover, agencies with little political 
support for their agendas probably could not fake such signals 
consistently.249 Thus, the quality of an agency’s rational explanation 
for its policy provides reviewing courts with important information 
about the political support for agency decisions that may be more 
reliable than direct disclosure. Under a political reason-giving regime, 
agencies could recite boilerplate language asserting that their policies 
are consistent with the president’s public-regarding political agenda, 
but they would have difficulty surviving hard-look review if the 
administration were not actually putting resources behind them. 
Thus, the signals sent by rationalist reasons may be a better 
mechanism than direct disclosure for producing information about 
the level of political support for administrative policy. Recognizing 
these dynamics, Professors Posner and Vermeule call for the 
development of “institutional mechanisms that impose heavier costs 
 
significant economic impact on the regulated industry is likely to be, for that reason alone, 
highly controversial.” (footnote omitted)); McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 37, at 1392 
(“[T]he agencies are understandably reluctant to rock the boat when to do so requires an 
enormously expensive rulemaking in which a successful outcome is by no means assured.”); 
Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency Actions, supra note 37, at 70 (“Many administrative law 
doctrines have powerful effects on the amount of resources an agency must expend to perform a 
statutorily assigned mission.”). 
 247. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory, supra note 244, at 755. 
 248. Id. It is important to note that other considerations, apart from political support, drive 
agency resource-allocation decisions. For instance, the existence of statutory deadlines may 
drive investments of agency resources. The existing literature focuses on political support, but 
its insights may apply more broadly to other strong bases of authority for administrative action, 
such as statutory or judicially imposed deadlines. 
 249. Although agencies sometimes invest significant resources in an effort to bulletproof 
policies that are politically controversial—as opposed to politically well-supported—agencies 
would be unlikely to engage in such a strategy successfully over the long term and against the 
wishes of an antagonistic administration. 
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on ill-motivated” executive actors to hinder self-serving 
characterizations of executive action and to amplify the credibility of 
the signals that well-meaning executives send about their policy 
commitments.250 To the extent that information forcing is the 
normative goal of political reason giving, it may already be served 
adequately by conventional models of administrative reason giving. 
In sum, the case for political reason giving is not supported by 
the theoretical frameworks in which that model is grounded. Even if 
the political reason-giving model fails to provide a viable alternative 
to rationalist theories of reason giving, however, its great contribution 
is that it forces a critical examination of rationalist theories and, in 
particular, the relationship between reason and power in governance. 
The deep flaw of rationalist theories is their suggestion that power 
somehow can be separated from or tempered by rationality. The 
virtue of reasons, in the rationalist account, is that they insulate 
citizens from the raw exercise of government power. There is 
something deeply unsatisfying about such a claim, about the way it 
obfuscates the arbitrary abuses of power that occur every day within 
rationalized legal systems,251 and about the way it brackets the 
inevitable presence of political power behind all administrative 
action. As an alternative to rationalist models, however, political 
reason giving does little better. From this perspective, reasons do not 
temper power; they mask it. The work of reasons, from a political 
perspective, is not to rationalize, but to reveal the power behind 
administrative action so that it can be tempered electorally. 
The problem with both perspectives is that they see reason and 
power as distinct from and in tension with each other, and this 
understanding leads them to characterize reason giving as external to 
the political power dynamics within agencies. In both conceptions, 
reason giving is a means of imposing external sources of discipline on 
agencies. What is largely missing from these perspectives is an 
 
 250. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 135, at 122–23. 
 251. See, e.g., JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW IAN SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, 
REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM (2009) (performing a statistical analysis of outcomes in asylum adjudications and 
concluding “that the outcome of a refugee’s quest for safety in America should be influenced 
more by law and less by a spin of the wheel of fate that assigns her case to a particular 
government official”); Mashaw, supra note 57, at 29 (rejecting “general explanations 
for . . . discontent with the rationalized administrative state” and asserting that at an extreme, 
“there is no real difference between the administrative rationality of the U.S. Social Security 
administration and the administrative rationality of the Rwandan military police”).  
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understanding of reason giving as a social practice that shapes 
administrative behavior intrinsically. The next Part outlines a theory 
of administrative reason giving as a social and organizational practice 
that fundamentally shapes the way administrative agencies look and 
the actions they take. These kinds of constraints are critical in a 
sprawling administrative apparatus that simply cannot be controlled 
by one individual—or her deputies—using hierarchical command. 
The real danger of political reason giving is that it would undermine 
these intrinsic sources of discipline without offering any alternative 
means of controlling agencies and getting things done. 
IV.  TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF REASON GIVING 
Social theory posits a number of functions served by both 
reasons themselves and the practice of reason giving. Reasons help 
human actors make sense of complex events. They “provide 
interpretations and explanations of experience. They make actions 
imaginable and consequences interpretable.”252 In this way, reasons 
construct how actors perceive the world and invest it with meaning. 
Similarly, the imperative to give reasons constructs individuals and 
organizations as particular types of actors and defines the terms on 
which they can sustain social ties with one another.253 Reason giving 
may not itself promote democratic deliberation or rationalize power 
as the rationalist account would maintain. It may not itself promote 
presidential control or electoral accountability as the political account 
would maintain. What reason giving does, however, is create social 
relationships and organizational structures that tend to channel the 
exercise of agency discretion within politically and socially acceptable 
parameters. 
The social and organizational framework supported by reason 
giving empowers agencies to do their jobs; it regularizes—if not 
rationalizes—the way that they do these jobs in reasonably 
predictable ways, and it constrains the kinds of actions that agencies 
deem possible and desirable to take. It does so through two 
 
 252. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 141 (1995) 
(citations omitted).  
 253. See LUC BOLTANSKI & LAURENT THÉVENOT, ON JUSTIFICATION: ECONOMIES OF 
WORTH 41 (Catherine Porter trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1991) (“Very diverse 
beings . . . turn out to be connected and arranged in relation to one another in groupings that 
are sufficiently coherent for their involvement to be judged effective, for the expected processes 
to be carried out, and for the situations to unfold correctly . . . .”). 
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mechanisms. First, reason giving constitutes agencies as organizations, 
shaping everything from routine staffing decisions to agency culture 
and the cognitive scripts that guide agency decisionmaking processes. 
Second, reason giving structures agencies’ interactions with citizens 
and with other legal and political institutions. In both respects, reason 
giving fundamentally shapes what agencies look like and how they 
act. In this Part, I discuss each of these mechanisms and explain how 
political reason giving would undermine them. 
A. Reason Giving Constitutes Agencies as Organizations 
For better or for worse, hard-look review has deeply influenced 
the organizational structure of contemporary administrative agencies. 
Agencies hire experts to study and corroborate their policy decisions, 
staff to review and respond to comments, economists to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of different policies, and lawyers to draft preambles 
explaining the reasons for policy decisions and to defend agency 
actions. Although all of this activity may be driven by the prospect of 
either reversal on judicial review or discipline by the executive, these 
professionals, occupying defined roles within the agency organization, 
shape and constrain the agency’s behavior on a day-to-day basis. The 
imperative to give reasons also shapes the culture of administrative 
agencies, or the way the agencies understand themselves as 
organizations. Taken together, these elements of an organization’s 
culture create taken-for-granted understandings about what it is 
possible and desirable for the organization to do. The following 
Sections first provide a general overview of theories of organizational 
structure and control and then discuss how key organizational 
structures that empower and constrain administrative agencies are 
supported by hard-look review and would be undermined by political 
reason giving. 
1. Structural Mechanisms That Shape and Constrain 
Organizations.  Although they often occupy a rarefied space in the 
political and legal imagination, political institutions like agencies and 
legislatures are, at base, organizations. Organizations are social 
groups that have been “established for the explicit purpose of 
achieving certain goals.”254 Organizations pursue these goals, in part, 
by establishing structures and social relationships to channel the 
 
 254. PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 5 (1962). 
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decision processes and behaviors of individual members.255 Thus, the 
behavior of actors in political institutions is a function not only of the 
distribution of political preferences and resources but also of the way 
those organizations are structured.256 Four broad types of structural 
mechanisms shape and constrain the way decisions are made within 
organizations: (1) specialization and division of labor, 
(2) standardized routines, (3) formal and informal authority 
structures, and (4) staff training.257  
First, organizations typically divide labor in a way that allows 
individuals to specialize and focus on discrete tasks.258 Within the 
organization, this practice creates groups of individuals who not only 
are focused on similar activities but who also often share similar 
professional or personal values.259 Depending on the power of these 
internal constituencies, their values can come to shape the 
organization’s decisionmaking practices and understanding of its 
mission more broadly.260 A famous example of this phenomenon in 
the organizational literature is the “flak-catching” office: 
[F]lak-catchers, who are commissioned to protect an organization 
from flak and to symbolize a commitment to deal appropriately with 
flak, quickly learn to enhance the importance of flak. The 
mechanisms are familiar. Partly, flak-catchers are chosen because of 
some willingness to deal with outsiders, perhaps because of prior 
affinity to them. Partly, they learn from their association with 
outsiders to identify with them. Partly, they discover that their 
importance in the organizations depends on the existence of flak.261 
 
 255. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 102–03 (1948) (describing the 
mechanisms “organization[s] employ[] to influence the decisions of individual members”). 
 256. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984) (describing how organizational 
structure and procedure help support political institutions). 
 257. SIMON, supra note 255, at 102–03. 
 258. Id. at 102. 
 259. See, e.g., SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 6 (1984) (arguing that 
“[e]nvironmental analysts not only help their agency by pointing out legal and political 
vulnerabilities on environmental issues, but also tend to have distinctive personal values”). 
 260. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION 
AND DEMOCRACY 58–59 (2002) (describing how the value system of an organization is formed 
to handle issues faced by the organization). 
 261. Martha S. Feldman & James G. March, Information in Organizations as Signal and 
Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 171, 181 (1981). 
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Through these mechanisms, “staff become involved in advocacy for 
their functions that can alter power relations within organizations 
over the long run.”262 
An organization can be shaped in significant ways by empowered 
internal constituencies that are committed to a particular set of 
values. For instance, a number of studies have found that compliance 
professionals are crucial to improving corporate compliance with 
regulatory goals.263 The improvement happens as compliance 
professionals embed issues of compliance into the routine 
decisionmaking processes of corporate managers and employees.264 Of 
course, the mere existence of compliance personnel, or internal 
constituencies committed to a defined set of values, hardly ensures 
the realization of a normative vision that might otherwise stand in 
tension with other organizational goals, such as profit maximization 
or political obedience. Rather, to embed their values in the 
decisionmaking process, internal norm generators must have 
“autonomy and influence”265 or “clout”266 within the organization. 
They must, in other words, be “seen as adding value to the 
[organization] as knowledgeable, reasonable, and politically 
important insiders.”267 
A second structural mechanism channeling organizational 
behavior is the set of routines or standard practices that organizations 
establish to guide the actions of their members.268 Routines embody 
 
 262. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150 
(1983). 
 263. E.g., PARKER, supra note 260, at 23–25; see also FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE 
REGULATION: BEYOND ‘PUNISH OR PERSUADE’ 165–66 (1997) (describing how internal 
compliance helps to decrease workplace-related fatalities); JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE 
WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 85–174 (1988) 
(describing corporate responses to the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration); Valerie Braithwaite, The Australian Government’s Affirmative Action 
Legislation: Achieving Social Change Through Human Resource Management, 15 LAW & POL. 
327, 341–52 (1993) (looking at corporate compliance with Australia’s affirmative-action 
legislation). 
 264. PARKER, supra note 260, at 125. 
 265. TAYLOR, supra note 259, at 256 (emphasis omitted). 
 266. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 359 
(1984). 
 267. DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF: HOW 
SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURES 176 (1998). 
 268. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 21 (1989); SIMON, supra note 255, at 102; Martha S. 
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the collective experience of the organization in addressing particular 
kinds of problems.269 They facilitate the coordination of different 
strands of activity within the organization and mitigate conflicts.270 
They promote efficient organizational operation by relieving 
individual members of the burden of determining anew each time a 
task arises how it should be done.271 More importantly, scholars have 
found that organizational routines exert “strong inertial pressures”272 
because they are “independent of the individual actors who execute 
them and are capable of surviving considerable turnover in 
individuals.”273 Thus, although individuals within organizations 
invariably have a certain amount of discretion, that discretion is 
channeled by “the allocation of attention, standards of evaluation, 
priorities, perceptions, and resources” sedimented in the 
organization’s routines.274 
Third, organizations shape the actions of their members through 
what Professor Herbert Simon describes as “systems of authority and 
influence.”275 Hierarchical authority structures may be important in 
shaping the attention and priorities of an organization’s members, but 
they are not the only forms of authority operating in organizations. 
Equally important are the informal systems of power and influence 
that develop in organizations based on the status of individual 
members and their relationships with one another.276 In bureaucratic 
organizations of all types, status and influence flow from individual 
 
 
 
Feldman & Barry T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing Organizational Routines as a Source of 
Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 94, 94 (2003). 
 269. See MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 268, at 24 (“Routines embody collective and 
individual identities, interests, values, and worldviews, thus constraining the allocation of 
attention, standards of evaluation, priorities, perceptions, and resources.” (citations omitted)). 
 270. Id.  
 271. SIMON, supra note 255, at 102; see also RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A 
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 119 (1992) (“Standard operating procedures are the 
memory of the organization.”). 
 272. Heather A. Haveman, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Organizational Change and 
Performance Under Conditions of Fundamental Environmental Transformation, 37 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 48, 49 (1992). 
 273. MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 268, at 22. 
 274. Id. at 24. 
 275. SIMON, supra note 255, at 103. 
 276. Id. 
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members’ professional prestige,277 their possession of information,278 
or their role as conduits for important information possessed by 
others.279 A common misconception, identified by Professors Richard 
Cyert and James March, is that “organizations are hierarchies in 
which higher levels control lower levels, and policies control 
implementation.”280 As Professors Cyert and March observe, 
“Portrayals built on such conceptions of order seem, however, to 
underestimate the confusion and complexity surrounding actual 
decision making.”281 Such portrayals also tend to overestimate 
managers’ ability to impose order through hierarchical commands—a 
point captured by Professor W. Richard Scott’s comment that “[n]o 
planners are so farseeing or omniscient as to be able to anticipate all 
the possible contingencies that might confront each position in the 
organization.”282 Instead, informal authority structures “play a larger 
role in producing dependable behavior than do commands or 
sanctions”283 and allow the organization to “impos[e] elements of 
order on a potentially inchoate world.”284 
Finally, the decisions of individuals operating within 
organizations are shaped by the training that those individuals receive 
about their organization’s procedures, its core goals and values, and 
their superiors’ expectations. Organizations socialize and educate 
their members to internalize norms about appropriate and 
inappropriate behavior, and this sense of what constitutes appropriate 
action in the organizational context becomes essential to defining and 
maintaining individuals’ organizational identities.285 As Professor 
 
 277. See, e.g., Carol A. Heimer, Explaining Variation in the Impact of Law: Organizations, 
Institutions, and Professions, in 15 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 29, 45 (Austin 
Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1995) (comparing the privileges among members of a healthcare 
team and observing that physicians have more control over decisionmaking than nurses or social 
workers). 
 278. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 993–98 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. 
of Cal. Press 1978) (1922) (emphasizing the importance of specialized knowledge in 
bureaucracies). 
 279. W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 75 
(1981). 
 280. CYERT & MARCH, supra note 271, at 232. 
 281. Id. 
 282. SCOTT, supra note 279, at 84. 
 283. Id. at 75. 
 284. March & Olsen, supra note 256, at 743. 
 285. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943, 948 (1998). 
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Simon notes, “The organization member acquires knowledge, skill, 
and identifications or loyalties that enable him to make decisions, by 
himself, as the organization would like him to decide.”286 
Organizations function more efficiently and predictably when their 
members anticipate institutional expectations rather than acquiescing 
to specific commands from superiors.287 
These four structural features of organizations, individually and 
in combination with one another, “account for much of the regularity 
and patterning that exist” in organizations,288 but their influence goes 
beyond merely shaping behavior. They generate normative and 
cognitive structures that are absorbed by the individual members of 
organizations, guiding not only their behavior but also their 
understanding of what is right and appropriate to do in a given 
situation. As stated by Professor March and his colleague Professor 
Johan Olsen, “Organizational action requires a model of the 
world,”289 and organizational structures provide such a model. The 
rituals, roles, and routines embedded in organizational structures 
serve a “sense-making” function, helping individuals understand 
complex environments and conveying norms and values about what is 
right and appropriate in a given situation.290 In this way, 
organizational structures define individuals’ perception of 
appropriate alternatives, likely consequences, and the normative 
desirability of their actions.291 Professors Dennis Gioia and Peter 
Poole summarize this point: “People in organizations know how to 
act appropriately because they have a working knowledge of their 
organizational world. They enact the ‘right’ behaviors most of the 
time in part because they retain a cognitive repertoire of scripts fitting 
 
 286. SIMON, supra note 255, at 103. 
 287. See id. at 129 (explaining that when a subordinate anticipates commands, “authority 
will need to be exercised only to reverse an incorrect decision”). 
 288. SCOTT, supra note 279, at 14. 
 289. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS 
19 (1976).  
 290. See Harrison M. Trice & Janice M. Beyer, Studying Organizational Cultures Through 
Rites and Ceremonials, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 653, 654 (1984) (“[C]ultural 
messages . . . express . . . norms and values that proclaim to system members the rightness of 
certain beliefs and practices over others.”). 
 291. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Institutional Perspectives on Political 
Institutions, 9 GOVERNANCE 247, 250 (1996) (“Rational action depends on subjective 
perceptions of alternatives, their consequences, and their evaluations. . . . [I]nstitutional 
conceptions see such calculations and anticipations as occurring within a broader framework of 
rules, roles, and identities.” (citations omitted)). 
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a host of organizational settings.”292 Thus, when an organization acts, 
its action is often motivated less by a calculation about the desirability 
of a particular outcome than by the reality that “it would be 
unthinkable to do otherwise.”293 
2. Deference Doctrine and the Organizational Structure of 
Agencies.  Placing the onus on agencies to articulate rational reasons 
for their actions, as the traditional deference regime does, fosters 
these kinds of internal disciplinary structures in administrative 
organizations. Hard-look review has encouraged agencies to develop 
internal constituencies of professionals who are committed to 
scientific, analytical, and reasoned decisionmaking; and even more 
importantly, it has given those constituencies some measure of 
policymaking clout within agency organizations. Agencies often face 
tremendous political pressure to adopt a particular policy position. 
The fact that they must ultimately justify their decisions on rational 
grounds gives these professionals a voice in the organization that they 
might not otherwise have. Hard-look review, among other factors, has 
also prompted agencies to develop routines that force consideration 
of the opinions and evidence provided by the agency’s expert 
constituencies.294 These routines, in turn, have given these 
constituencies informal authority within the agency organizations that 
rely on them for information. Taken together, these effects have 
produced an agency culture that focuses agencies’ attention on 
 
 292. Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in Organizational Behavior, 9 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 449, 450 (1984). 
 293. Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
145, 149 (1991).  
 294. What I characterize here as “routines,” in the parlance of organizational theory, legal 
scholarship characterizes as “additional procedures, analytical requirements, and external 
review mechanisms.” See, e.g., McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 37, at 1386. For instance, 
Professor McGarity argues that agencies subject to hard-look review perceived the need to draft 
much lengthier and much more technical justifications for their rules than they had done under 
less stringent deference regimes. Id. at 1387. Professor McGarity reports:  
The “concise general statement of basis and purpose” for the original primary and 
secondary ambient air quality standards promulgated under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970 consisted of a single page in the Federal Register when they 
were promulgated in 1971. The preamble to the 1987 revision of a single primary 
standard consumed 36 pages in the Federal Register and was supported by a 100-plus-
page staff paper, a lengthy Regulatory Impact Analysis that cost the agency millions 
of dollars, and a multi-volume criteria document. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Agencies have relied on expert professional constituencies to provide 
the substantive content for the additional layers of analysis perceived as necessary to survive 
hard-look review. Id. at 1398. 
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policies that will be publicly justifiable based both on the available 
evidence and on the grounds for past decisions.295 
Although models of political reason giving purport to preserve 
rational grounds for justification as a doctrinal matter, allowing 
enhanced deference for “legitimate” political reasons would 
undermine the constituencies within agency organizations that are 
committed to developing nonpolitical reasons for agency actions in 
two important ways and would thereby weaken the foundations of 
internal disciplinary structures. First, political appointees who can 
justify their decisions on judicial review based, in part, on political 
motivations will have less need to rely on professional staff to support 
agency actions. This decreased reliance would significantly diminish 
the power and informal authority of professional constituencies 
within agency organizations, along with the values those 
constituencies embody and the structural processes and routines they 
tend to support. 
Second, and perhaps even more debilitating in the long run, 
political reason giving would undermine the motivation of the 
professional members of these constituencies and would lead to their 
exodus from agency organizations. As Professor Scott points out, “Of 
all the many resources required by organizations, the most vital are 
the contributions of [their] human participants.”296 These participants 
have many choices regarding how to spend their time and thus must 
be motivated to contribute to the organization’s goals. In public 
service, an arena in which material rewards often do not fully 
compensate individuals for the effort they expend, many agency 
professionals are motivated by the meaning that they derive from 
contributing to the realization of the organization’s goals,297 especially 
when those goals reinforce their professional identity or personal 
values.298 Privileging political reasons for agency action could degrade 
 
 295. See Schauer, supra note 46, at 657 (arguing that the reason-giving model creates 
consistency and justifiability because “in the future [decisionmakers will] treat their prior 
statements as constraining” and because the strategy reduces “bias, self-interest, insufficient 
reflection, or simply excess haste”). 
 296. SCOTT, supra note 279, at 158. 
 297. See id. at 160 (“[M]embers join [a purposive organization] because they wish to help in 
achieving the goals espoused by the organization; and the organization, in achieving its goals, 
supplies inducements to its members securing their continuing contributions.”). 
 298. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW 
OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 42 (2010) (arguing that pay 
incentives are less important for a person who “thinks she should work on behalf of the firm” 
because “[h]er ideal is to exert high effort”); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: 
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this crucial source of meaning for expert and professional staff, 
causing demoralization and attrition. For example, dedicated medical 
researchers would not be highly motivated to work for the FDA if 
they knew that a court would uphold the agency’s approval or 
disapproval of drugs based on the administration’s “value preferences 
or policy calls.”299  
Of course, it is possible that this kind of deprofessionalization of 
agencies is exactly what political reason giving aims to achieve. There 
are certainly drawbacks to the professional cultures and practices that 
structure agencies under hard-look review, including the kinds of 
delay and technical opacity often characterized as “ossification.”300 
The desire to eliminate ossification may translate operationally into a 
desire to undo the layers of professional staffing and the culture of 
justification that surrounds rulemaking. But this enterprise seems a 
dangerous gamble in the absence of any consideration of what might 
replace existing organizational structures and what agencies might 
come to look like under a political reason-giving regime. 
Whatever organizational structures political reason giving might 
produce, hierarchical political control cannot replicate two key 
functions served by the structures created and supported by hard-
look review. First, organizational structures constrain and regularize 
agency decisions in the absence of direct oversight by either the 
political branches or the judiciary. This kind of intrinsic discipline is 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 48 (2010) 
(“The identity and esteem of an individual often depend upon wider social evaluations of the 
organization to which she belongs.”); SCOTT, supra note 279, at 160 (suggesting that 
organizations must “sustain the interests of members”). 
 299. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1171. Professor Watts suggests that her proposal is aimed 
at preserving a space for science by segregating politics into its own distinct sphere. Watts, supra 
note 4, at 40–41. I disagree not only with the fundamental premise that the two can be separated 
but also with the suggestion that giving greater credence to politics will have the effect of 
empowering science. The premise that the two can be separated relies on untenable notions of 
pure scientific objectivity. If scientific objectivity cannot be achieved, the primary goal would 
have to be more modest, such as preserving some amount of autonomy for the development of 
scientific knowledge. But power is crucial to maintaining autonomy. Hard-look review confers 
power on scientific constituencies; political reason giving diminishes their sphere of power. This 
calculus underlies my claims in this Section. 
 300. For a description of the problem of “ossification,” see, for example, William S. Jordan, 
III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with 
Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 393, 394 (2000); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an 
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1285 (1989); Pierce, Seven Ways, supra 
note 37, at 61; and Paul R. Verkuil, Comment, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 453 (1995). 
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of critical importance because the bulk of agency activity takes place 
outside the glare of political or judicial spotlights. Whereas academic 
literature understandably focuses on the narrow band of significant, 
high-profile agency policymaking exercises, the mine run of agency 
activity—issuing licenses, making grants, targeting enforcement, and 
formulating more mundane policy—will never cross the president’s 
desk or a judge’s bench. The discipline constraining these pervasive 
activities comes largely from the social and organizational structures 
that shape the way agency staff do their jobs. 
Second, these organizational structures give agencies, and expert 
constituencies within agencies, a means of pushing back against 
inappropriate exercises of executive power. Although Professors 
Watts and Mendelson concede that the president cannot direct policy 
that contradicts statutory mandates or the agency’s factual findings, 
such safeguards are utterly hollow in the absence of internal 
constituencies that are committed to the values of statutory fidelity 
and scientific integrity and who are empowered to press their cases up 
the ranks of the agency. 
B. Reason Giving Structures the Interactions Among Legal and  
Political Institutions 
In social theory, reason giving is a practice associated with 
negotiating social relationships and facilitating cooperation and 
collective action.301 Further, it is a way of validating the hierarchies 
that result from social interaction and of justifying the outcomes of 
these interactions in widely acceptable terms. As sociologist Charles 
Tilly explains, “Whatever else they are doing when they give reasons, 
people are clearly negotiating their social lives. They are saying 
something about relations between themselves and those who hear 
their reasons.”302 This insight can be applied to legal institutions 
 
 301. See, e.g., BOLTANSKI & THÉVENOT, supra note 253, at 37 (“[W]e propose to take 
seriously the imperative to justify that underlies the possibility of coordinating human 
behavior . . . .”); ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 162–63 (1971) (“The position is 
being taken, then, that the individual constantly acts to provide information that he is of sound 
character and reasonable competency.”); CHARLES TILLY, WHY? 30 (2006) (“Most of us feel 
more comfortable challenging the reasons given by taxi drivers than those proposed by 
physicians. But in either case we are, among other things, negotiating definitions of the relations 
between us.”); C. Wright Mills, Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 
904, 907 (1940) (“[A]cts often will be abandoned if no reason can be found that others will 
accept. Diplomacy in choice of motive often controls the diplomat.”). 
 302. TILLY, supra note 301, at 15. 
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balancing their relationships with one another in a government of 
divided powers. The problem with political reason giving is that it 
would circumscribe the terms of this negotiation and establish a fixed 
hierarchy among institutions through the back door of deference 
doctrine. 
1. The Sociology of Reason Giving.  In his book Why?,303 
Professor Tilly articulates a matrix of different modes of reason giving 
and argues that the types of reasons that are given—and accepted—
reveal significant information about the status positions or social roles 
within a given relationship.304 In Tilly’s typology, reason types are 
situated along two axes, as demonstrated in Table 1: one axis that 
runs from formulaic reasons to reasons that attempt to explain cause-
effect relationships, and another that runs from popular to specialized 
discourses.305 The key distinction for purposes of understanding the 
effect of political reason giving is between formulaic reasons and 
cause-effect accounts. Formulaic reasons “identify an appropriate 
correspondence” between the event, action or outcome to be 
explained and some antecedent event or action, but they make little 
attempt to articulate the causal chain connecting the two.306 By 
contrast, cause-effect accounts “trace causal lines” between 
antecedent actions and subsequent actions or outcomes.307 In the 
following discussion, I describe the different types of reasons that 
Tilly’s matrix generates and I illustrate what a reason in each category 
might look like by reference to a hypothetical example of a social 
situation in which reason giving is demanded: imagine that a partner 
at a large law firm asks an associate why she works so hard. 
 
 303. TILLY, supra note 301. 
 304. Id. at 15. These are, of course, ideal types, and many reasons may fall somewhere in 
between these stylized categories. 
 305. Id. at 19. 
 306. Id. at 20. 
 307. Id. 
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Table 1.  Reason-Giving Typology 
 
As illustrated by Table 1, formulaic reasons come in two flavors: 
conventions, which are popular,308 and codes, which are specialized.309 
Conventions are the generally accepted colloquialisms of social 
interaction: “Why did you get the job?” “Just lucky, I guess.” “How 
could you forget our coffee date?” “My head’s just not on straight 
these days.” “How did you twist your ankle?” “I’m such a klutz.” 
Conventions make no claim to causal adequacy.310 They are the 
reasons that individuals give because it would be too exhausting, if 
not cognitively prohibitive, to articulate the cause-and-effect 
relationships of every action or situation in which reasons are 
demanded.311 So, for instance, if the hypothetical associate were to 
explain her diligence with a convention, she might say something like, 
“Idle hands are the devil’s playground.” 
Codes likewise “involve no pretense of providing adequate 
causal accounts,”312 but they rely for their force on the authority of 
expertise or specialization.313 Codes typically take the form of 
categories, procedures, and rules.314 Reasons in the form of codes 
purport to justify actions or explain situations by citation to these 
sources of authority. Professor Tilly explains that, in contrast to 
 
 308. Popular reasons are those grounded in “practical knowledge not only from individual 
experience but also from the social settings in which we live.” Id. at 21. They are context specific 
and “vary from one social setting to another.” Id. 
 309. Specialized reasons “rely[] on extensive training” in a particular discourse or discipline. 
Id. at 19. 
 310. Id. at 40. 
 311. Id. at 15–16. 
 312. Id. at 15. 
 313. Id. at 125 (“Codes emerge from the incremental efforts of organizations to impose 
order on the ideas, resources, activities, and people that fall under their control.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 314. Id. at 102. 
 Popular Specialized 
Formulas 
Conventions: Generally accepted 
reasons for events that require 
explanation  
Codes: Rule-based explanations of 
actions based on authoritative 
source such as a legal or religious 
prescription 
Cause-Effect 
Accounts 
Stories: Explanatory narratives 
incorporating cause-effect accounts 
of unfamiliar phenomena or 
exceptional events 
Technical Accounts: Reasons that 
claim to identify reliable relations of 
cause and effect based on expert 
knowledge 
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cause-effect accounts, “codes need not bear much explanatory weight 
so long as they conform to the available rules.”315 Turning back to the 
hypothetical associate, she could answer her partner by citation to a 
code: “The employee compensation manual requires that associates 
bill 2,200 hours per year in order to be eligible for promotion.” 
Cause-effect accounts similarly come in two flavors: stories, 
which are popular, and technical accounts, which are specialized. 
Stories draw on common knowledge and everyday experience to 
weave a narrative that attempts to causally explain actions, events, or 
outcomes.316 The fact that the receivers of stories may “find those 
causal lines absurd or incomprehensible” is irrelevant to their 
categorization.317 It is the attempt to articulate a causal chain that 
counts rather than that chain’s credibility.318 If the hypothetical 
associate were to answer with a story, it might look something like the 
following: “My parents immigrated to this country and worked hard 
to make a living to provide for our family. I work hard because that’s 
what they taught me to do and because I want to honor their 
sacrifice.” 
Finally, technical accounts in Professor Tilly’s scheme are 
specialized reasons that “claim to identify reliable connections of 
cause and effect” based on the formal training and accumulated 
expertise of the reason giver.319 Thus, they often depend on the reason 
giver’s disciplinary background, and they can be technical or opaque 
to inexpert receivers.320 For instance, if the overworked associate had 
been trained as a sociologist, her technical account might go 
something like this: “I am working to overcome the structural 
disadvantage I suffer in the workplace because of my gender.” Or if 
she had been trained as a psychologist, she might say, “Working hard 
 
 315. Id. at 17. Professionals often derive codes by synthesizing and abridging the ordinary 
stories people tell. So, for example, medical professionals who hear countless stories about 
illnesses and ailments distill those stories into categories that provisionally suggest diagnoses or 
treatment. Cf. id. at 103 (“Within any . . . arena [of professional expertise], authorities 
commonly change the rules as they encounter some new problem; accumulated rules therefore 
provide a map of significant earlier problems people have faced in their arena.”). 
 316. See id. at 15 (“Stories: explanatory narratives incorporating cause-effect accounts of 
unfamiliar phenomena or of exceptional events . . . .”). 
 317. Id. at 20. 
 318. Id. at 20–21. 
 319. Id. at 18. 
 320. See id. at 171–73 (illustrating the specialization of technical accounts with an example 
of students in different fields). 
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and getting ahead reinforces my identity as a feminist committed to 
workplace equality.” 
The significance of these categories lies in what the different 
kinds of reasons reveal about the social relationships in which they 
are proffered and either accepted or rejected. For instance, formulaic 
reasons are more likely to suffice if the reason giver occupies a 
superior social rank to the reason receiver. In the words of Professor 
Tilly, “Givers who offer formulas thereby claim superiority and/or 
distance” from receivers.321 Were the overworked associate to turn the 
tables and ask the partner why she works so hard, it would be entirely 
within the conventional social boundaries of this relationship for the 
superior to quip, “Idle hands are the devil’s playground!” But reason 
receivers do not always accept formulaic accounts. When a reason 
receiver rejects a proffered formulaic response and demands a cause-
effect account, this demand implicitly challenges the reason giver’s 
assumption of superiority.322 Even when the reason giver clearly has 
superior status or authority, the reason receiver can prompt cause-
effect accounts if she has some means of what Professor Tilly 
describes as “visible power to affect [the] giver’s subsequent 
welfare.”323 
Typically, the type of reasons given corresponds with the giver’s 
presumed relationship with the receiver.324 But reasons do not always 
match the apparent nature of the relationship, and in such situations, 
the reasons proffered may represent a proposed redefinition of the 
relationship and the status positions within it.325 So, for instance, one 
would not expect the law firm associate to respond to a query about 
her work habits from her managing partner by quipping, “Idle hands 
are the devil’s playground.” If she did so, one might surmise that she 
was signaling a shift in the power dynamics of the relationship: 
perhaps she was planning to leave the firm and no longer cared how 
she was perceived. It is in this way that reason giving defines the 
boundaries of relationships and either acknowledges or negotiates the 
status of the parties within them. 
 
 321. Id. at 174 (emphasis omitted). 
 322. Id.  
 323. Id. at 175 (emphasis omitted). 
 324. Id. at 173. 
 325. See id. (“[T]he giving of reasons creates, confirms, negotiates, or repairs relations 
between the parties.”). 
SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  1:56 AM 
1876 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1811 
2. Reason Giving and Interbranch Status Hierarchy.  Viewed 
through this sociological lens, the debate about political reason giving 
is a debate about the status relationships of different legal 
institutions. Political reasons take the form of codes, or citations to 
authority: if an agency is acting both within its statutory authority and 
in accord with legitimate presidential authority,326 it should be upheld. 
In this view, courts lack the status to ask the executive to give a causal 
account of its actions. One view of Fox would be that Justice Scalia 
merely acknowledged the agency’s statutory and executive authority 
to enact a policy that the administration believed was better than the 
old, and that this information is all a court needs to know. 
Hard-look review can be thought of as a demand by courts that 
agencies go beyond mere codes to provide reasons that will specify 
the cause-effect relationships that produced the outcome at issue. 
This characterization is precisely why hard-look review has been so 
controversial. It is, at base, the courts resisting executive claims to a 
fixed, superior status. Hard-look review allows courts to evaluate the 
adequacy of the executive’s cause-effect explanations. 
Many commentators have taken hard-look review to be a 
demand by courts for technical accounts, requiring an agency to 
marshal expertise to craft a causal explanation about why its policy is 
justified.327 In fact, this conception is what appears to be motivating 
Professor Watts’s critique of hard-look review.328 Consider, however, 
that courts have applied this standard of review in a way that also 
encompasses less technical and more popular cause-effect narratives. 
In fact, in Fox, the Court did not merely defer to the FCC’s authority, 
but rather examined the substance of the reasons given by the agency 
for its decision. The central reasons for the FCC’s change to the 
fleeting-expletives policy could have been characterized as stories in 
 
 326. As discussed in Part II.B, political reason-giving models would not permit agencies to 
claim deference merely because “the president made them do it.” They would, however, permit 
agencies to claim deference for actions ordered by the president based on the legitimate reasons 
articulated by the president. That agencies would cite to reasons articulated by an authority 
figure rather than to the bald authority of that figure does not change the reasons’ status as 
codes, or citations to authority, in the way that term is used in Professor Tilly’s matrix. 
 327. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 37, at 62–63 (describing the virtues of apolitical expertise 
in the administrative process); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 108–09 (arguing that courts play an “expertise-
forcing” role when agencies fail to provide a technical justification for their decisions). 
 328. See Watts, supra note 4, at 12 (discussing how the “current demand for 
technical . . . explanations” is a development exemplifying why the role of politics needs to be 
better understood). 
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Professor Tilly’s terms. The FCC argued that if it were to exempt 
fleeting expletives categorically from enforcement, the exemption 
would encourage more widespread use of single, offensive words, a 
result that would be harmful to the nation’s children and that might 
encourage children to use more profane language themselves—a 
consequence that would, presumably, be harmful to the rest of 
society.329 There was no evidence for this proposition. The FCC’s 
argument was a narrative that purported to establish causal 
relationships by drawing on popular understandings and experiences. 
Perhaps the correct reading of Fox, then, is that courts have the status 
to demand cause-effect accounts of agency actions on judicial review 
but that these reasons need not be invariably technical. In some 
circumstances, more popular narratives will suffice.330 
An understanding of rational justification that encompasses 
more popular cause-effect accounts would satisfy many of the 
concerns that political reason-giving models seek to address, but it 
would do so from within the existing doctrinal framework for 
arbitrary-and-capricious review and would arguably do so better than 
mere citation to legitimate political authority. First, stories make 
transparent the values underlying an administrative decision. There is 
no mistaking what values underlie the FCC’s new fleeting-expletives 
policy. Second, they do so in widely understandable terms. Although 
stories can be criticized because they “enormously simplify the 
processes involved” in the relationships they describe,331 this kind of 
simplification can serve important purposes: as Professor Tilly 
explains, because stories rely “on widely available knowledge rather 
than technical expertise, they help make the world intelligible.”332 This 
kind of broad intelligibility is essential to the political accountability 
of administration that models of political reason giving seek. In 
articulating stories in support of its decision, the FCC was making the 
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provocative suggestion that the primary audience for administrative 
reasons, at least in certain circumstances, might be the public rather 
than judges accustomed to receiving and reviewing technical accounts. 
At the same time, requiring agencies to provide cause-effect accounts 
of their actions instead of formulaic reasons preserves for courts the 
power and status necessary to police these actions meaningfully. 
This social account of reason giving has significant affinities with 
functional approaches to separation of powers that focus on the 
“relationships and interconnections”333 between and among the three 
constitutional branches and administrative agencies. The functionalist 
approach seeks to balance and restrain the exercise of government 
power not through formal limitations, but rather through what 
Professor Cynthia Farina describes as “the carefully orchestrated 
disposition and sharing of authority.”334 Professor Emily Meazell 
demonstrates how this balance gets calibrated, in part, through 
ongoing dialogues between courts and agencies.335 Rational reason 
giving, or reason giving that demands cause-effect accounts, facilitates 
this kind of dialogue, sharing, and balancing of power among the 
branches in their day-to-day interactions. By contrast, an approach to 
reason giving that privileges political reasons, or mere citations to 
legitimate presidential authority, would arguably fix the roles of these 
institutions and would circumscribe their ability to calibrate and 
recalibrate their relationships as circumstances might demand. It 
would, in other words, formalize a particular vision of the status 
hierarchy among the various branches, placing the executive squarely 
at the top in all matters over which agencies have discretion to act. 
Whatever the merits of a more formal approach to separation of 
powers, this contested vision of the constitutional constraints on 
administration should be discussed more thoroughly and explicitly 
before being imposed de facto through deference doctrine. 
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CONCLUSION 
Models of political reason giving present a welcome challenge to 
prevailing views about reason and politics in administrative 
justification, but they ultimately fail on their own terms, and they fail 
to meet the challenge of transforming fundamental understandings 
about the role that reasons play in administration. Arbitrary-and-
capricious review is a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing constraints 
on agency discretion, but rules alone do not constrain. Hard-look 
review has fostered social and organizational mechanisms that 
empower and constrain agencies, both in concert with political 
control and in the vast array of cases in which such top-down 
guidance is entirely absent. This doctrinal framework should not be 
discarded until a fuller account is made of what would take its place. 
This plea goes beyond the debate about political reason giving. 
Administrative law is ultimately enacted through the filter of the 
organizational structures that constitute agencies and the social and 
institutional relationships in which those structures are embedded. It 
is crucial to understand how different rules might create and shape 
the mechanisms that so deeply influence what agencies do. Legal 
scholarship has begun to recognize the potential power of internal 
organizational constraints on government institutions. The literature 
on internal separation-of-powers measures, for instance, has 
suggested that even in the absence of meaningful judicial or 
congressional checks, the power of the executive can be constrained, 
at least to a certain extent, by structuring executive institutions to 
ensure politically responsive decisionmaking.336 My argument here is 
not that the internal organizational structures of agencies are a 
substitute or a backstop for legal or political constraints on agency 
action, but rather that they are the mechanism by which these larger 
constraints get enacted. As Professor Gillian Metzger observes in the 
 
 336. See, e.g., WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN, RANDOLPH MOSS, CHRISTOPHER 
SCHROEDER, JOSEPH R. GUERRA, BETH NOLAN, TODD PETERSON, CORNELIA T.L. PILLARD, 
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH, RICHARD SHIFFRIN, WILLIAM 
MICHAEL TREANOR, DAVID BARRON, STUART BENJAMIN, LISA BROWN, PAMELA HARRIS, 
NEIL KINKOPF, MARTIN LEDERMAN & MICHAEL SMALL, PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE 
OF LEGAL COUNSEL 4 (2004), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004%20programs_
OLC%20principles_white%20paper.pdf; Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: 
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319 (2006) 
(“[T]he collapse of external checks and balances . . . demonstrate[s] the need for internal 
ones.”); Metzger, supra note 19, at 425 (valuing accountability as a check on the executive but 
still highly valuing the use of external checks from other branches). 
SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  1:56 AM 
1880 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1811 
separation-of-powers context, it is important to design doctrinal 
frameworks in a way that recognizes how “[i]nternal and external 
checks reinforce and operate in conjunction with one another.”337 
Proposals for administrative-law reform should likewise consider how 
they would impact internal checks on agencies. 
This Article’s theoretical approach to administrative reason 
giving and administrative-law reform has three important benefits. 
First, it highlights the real dangers of a move toward more politicized 
reason giving. Through this lens, the problem with political reasons is 
not that they are irrational; it is that they are likely to erode the very 
social and organizational structures that actually constrain—and 
enable—agencies in their day-to-day activities without theorizing 
what would take their place. 
Second, a conception of agency constraints as fundamentally 
social and organizational demonstrates why deference doctrine still 
matters and why judges, lawyers, and scholars should care about 
getting it right. Professor David Zaring’s finding that courts remand 
agency actions at roughly the same rate under each level of 
deference338 has prompted some soul searching—or at least footnote 
dropping—among administrative-law scholars concerned that the 
finding might reduce the importance of which deference standard 
prevails—and thus their scholarly advocacy of one standard versus 
another.339 A focus on the social and organizational manifestation of 
different doctrinal frameworks helps to move the discussion beyond 
this rather debilitating insight. The choice of a doctrinal framework 
may or may not matter to the outcome of litigation once an agency 
finds itself in court, but it can matter a great deal for the way agencies 
structure their day-to-day activities. Administrative-law scholarship 
should be thinking less about the formal coherence of doctrine and 
more about what kinds of agencies different doctrinal frameworks 
might create. 
Third and finally, this Article’s approach provides a richer and 
more complex way of thinking about the relationship between reason 
and politics in administration, pushing beyond the view that one or 
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the other dominates administrative decisionmaking and preserving a 
space for multiple and conflicting narratives about regulation. In the 
wake of the late twentieth-century regulatory reform movement, 
aspirational New Deal narratives that saw regulation as the 
application of expert knowledge to pressing modern problems in 
service of the public interest have gradually been displaced by 
economic narratives about regulation as inefficient, beholden to 
narrow private interests, and, in some sense, impossible, given 
humans’ limited cognitive capabilities.340 Highlighting political reasons 
for agency actions is likely to erode further the aspirational narratives 
about what regulation is and what it might be. Aspirational narratives 
are inherently fragile because regulation always and inevitably falls 
short of them. But it is important to ensure that they remain a part of 
the dialogue about regulation because losing sight of them would 
deprive the regulatory state of its normative foundation. 
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